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ARTICLES
THE GAELIC GOETZ: A CASE OF SELFDEFENSE IN IRELAND
Stacy Caplow*
ABSTRACT

For two years, the name Padraig Nally was a household
word in Ireland. Nally killed an intruder on his farm in a rural
community by shooting him in the back as he was running away,
already injured from a brutal beating. The intruder was a Traveller, a minority group in Ireland that is mistrusted and ostracized. The killing was so far from the paradigmatic self-defense
claim that the trial judge refused to instruct the jury on a full
justification defense. Indicted for murder, Nally was convicted
of manslaughter under a doctrine in Ireland called 'excessive
force.' After the appeals court reversed because this instruction
was tantamount to a directed verdict of conviction, Nally was
retried and acquitted. The verdict was praised by Nally's supporters who sympathized with his fear and reaction, and criticized by those who claimed the crime was rooted in bigotry and
prejudice.
This case raises similar questions to the high profile U.S.
case, People v. Goetz. Taking advantage of the widespread
awareness of this case, this Article discusses Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Nally as an example of a controversial self-defense claim that resulted in an acquittal despite powerful evidence to the contrary. The case involves the doctrine of
'excessive force' once adopted in some Commonwealth countries, but now unique to Ireland where it allows for a manslaughter conviction. This Article suggests that juries struggle in
cases involving lawful force that fall short of true justification
because these juries are reluctant to punish overzealousness and
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bad judgment when responsive force is otherwise legitimate. Juries searching for compassionate alternatives find other ways of
understanding the evidence. While a jury might still acquit a
Nally or a Goetz because of the notoriety of their case, in the
typical self-defense case, a manslaughter conviction based on excessive force presents an attractive option to an all-or-nothing
approach. Excessive force mitigation is alive and well in Ireland, and, in a slightly revised version, finding a place in England also.
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INTRODUCTION

Every so often a crime story captures the interest and ignites
the imagination of the public, commanding attention and monopolizing headlines throughout the trial, and even beyond. The momentum of such cases might derive from the infamy of the
individuals involved, the upsetting nature of the crime, or the conjunction of the legal and moral questions implicated. In the United
States, there have been more "trials of the century" than centuries
themselves. This is the story of one such sensational case that took
place in Ireland, Director of Public Prosecutions (D.P.P.) v. Padraig Nally.!
Few Americans would have heard of Padraig Nally, but he
dominated the media and conversation in 2006 during the three
months I spent in Ireland just as Bernhard Goetz, "the subway vigilante,"2 galvanized the general public and the legal community in
New York twenty years earlier. Both Goetz and Nally are emblematic cases for many key issues of self-defense that continue to
preoccupy legal theorists, judges, and increasingly, juries. Even afI D.P.P. v. Nally [2006] C.C.A. 128 (Ir.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/casesl
IECCA/2006/C128.html (last visited Sept, 14, 2008).
2 People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96 (1986). Before the identity of the shooter was known,
he was given this nickname by the N.Y. Post. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELFDEFENSE; BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 2 (1988). A partial trial transcript

is available at

CAROL A. ROEHRENBECK, PEOPLE V. GOETZ. THE SUMMATIONS AND THE

CHARGES To THE JURY

(1989).
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ter twenty years, Goetz is the classic case introducing law students
to self-defense doctrine.3
This Article, inspired by the drama of the Nally case and its
similarities to Goetz, explores the controversies that continue to
surround the use of deadly force in self-defense. Part II relates the
compelling story of the killing in Nally, followed by a review of
Irish law of self-defense. Close observation of this foreign case, so
reminiscent of a canonical American case, provides an opportunity
to reexamine what seems to be happening at trials where verdicts
that reflect a defense-generous application of the law of self-defense confound common sense.
The Article further explores the notion of jury independence
(a less aggressive form of jury nullification) as an explanation for
the not guilty verdicts in both cases. It proffers a descriptive conclusion about what seems to be happening when juries are given
broad freedom to apply fairly loose standards to upsetting and divisive facts, and suggests that, at least in these inflammatory cases,
juries blur theoretical lines between the traditional defense categories of justification and excuse. Neither the Goetz nor the Nally
jury deliberately set out to make the kind of public statement usually associated with nullification; nonetheless, their respective verdicts are best understood as a repudiation of the traditional
objective weighing of proportionality in self-defense. Instead,
these juries made a more personalized judgment about the blameworthiness of an individual who reacts out of fear, an analysis that
seems to judge the actor, not the act, privileging the judgment of a
person responding under extreme stress.
This Article argues that an already porous, progressively more
subjective legal standard of self-defense that increasingly defers to
jury evaluation enables acquittal-oriented jurors to import personal
values into the process to achieve their desired result. This is a
development that criminal law theory and practice should acknowl3 People v. Goetz appears in most Criminal Law casebooks in the section on selfdefense. See, e.g., KATE E. BLOCH & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEM-

501 (2005); DAVID CRUMP, NEIL P. COHEN, LAURIE L. LEVENSON,
& PENELOPE PETHER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 297 (2005); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL
LAW 504 (4th ed. 2007); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 751 (7th ed. 2001); ELLEN S. PODGOR, PEPORARY APPROACH
JOHN T. PARRY

TER J. HENNING, ANDREW TASLITZ & ALFREDO GARCIA, CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS AND

PRACTICE 542 (2005; PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 502 (2d ed.

1995).
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edge and may want to redress by recognizing more verdict options
than traditional self-defense allows. In Ireland, a country whose
relevant laws are largely the heritage of common law patchwork
development, law reform efforts are underway to grapple with the
inconsistencies and murkiness of its current standards regarding
deadly defensive force, in part due to criticisms of existing law and
its effects that surfaced in D.P.P. v. Nally.

II.

NOTORIOUS CASES: FEAR, DEADLY FORCE AND
ENSUING SOCIAL DISTRESS

The Goetz case was highly publicized locally and well known
nationally. Most Americans still remember the 1984 mid-day
shooting of four black teenagers during a holiday season New York
City subway ride by a white man who claimed that he thought he
was about to be robbed. He shot and injured them with an unlicensed gun, continued to fire, then ran away. The case preoccupied a public that both championed and denounced Bernhard
Goetz. During an era of high crime rates in New York City, the
case provoked intense feelings and loud debates about race relations, urban crime, ineffective policing, and whether Goetz was a
hero or villain. The prosecution also produced legal precedent
clarifying the statutory standard for self-defense in New York
State,4 and generated scholarly analysis both about the role of race
in the doctrine of justification5 and the behavior of juries in such
6
highly charged cases.
Despite his confession, his unlawful possession of a loaded
weapon, and, by some accounts, his use of disproportionate force,
Goetz was acquitted of attempted murder and assault. 7 The jury
found Goetz's use of deadly force, based on his factually mistaken,
4 Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d at 111-13.
5 Aaron Goldstein, Race, Reasonableness, and the Rule of Law, 76 S. CAL. L. REV.
1189, 1191 (2003); Camille A. Nelson, Consistently Revealing the Inconsistencies: The Construction of Fear in the Criminal Law, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1261, 1267-74 (2004); Kenneth
W. Simons, Self-Defense, Mens Rea, and Bernhard Goetz, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1179, 1189
(1989) (book review); Michael Andrew Tesner, Racial Paranoiaas a Defense to Crimes of
Violence: An Emerging Theory of Self-Defense or Insanity, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 307
(1991); Cynthia Kwei Yung-Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception
of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996). Other articles include Goetz in a more
general discussion of self-defense See, e.g., V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2001).
6 JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 1-8 (1991).

7 He was convicted of the weapon charge and sentenced to one year in prison.
FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 198, 216-17.
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or at least prematurely formed, belief that the four youths were
about to rob him to be not unlawful.8
Twenty years later, in County Mayo, Ireland, 9 Padraig Nally, a
sixty-two year old bachelor farmer, killed a trespasser named John
"Frog" Ward, a member of the marginalized Traveller community.1° While there was much public outrage condemning this violence, a similar number, or more, expressed deep sympathy for
Nally and discounted the role that ethnicity played in triggering
Nally's lethal conduct. After two trials, a jury found Nally's use of
fatal force not unlawful despite his confession, his questionable belief that the intruder posed a threat of imminent physical harm, and
his use of undisputed excessive force."
All of Ireland, a comparatively small country with only a few
national media outlets, knew every detail of the crime and the legal
aftermath of Nally.' 2 Newspapers and the national television network, RTE, regularly covered the story from October 14, 2004, the
day after the shooting, until its conclusion. This extensive reporting included the initial trial and conviction of manslaughter in the
summer of 2005 (Nally I), the October 2006 reversal in the Court
of Criminal Appeal,' 3 and the retrial and acquittal in Dublin's Central Criminal Court on December 14, 2006 (Nally II). Declamations by public figures, letters to the editor, and bloggers filled
much print and cyberspace with diverse opinions throughout the
two-year course of the case.14
8 In New York State, the Penal Law provides for the lawful use of deadly force to
prevent a robbery. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(b) (McKinney).
9 "County Mayo, located in the west of Ireland, is the third largest county in the country with an area of 5,398 sq. km. (2,084 sq. miles) and a population of 110,713 according to
the 1991 census." http://www.mayohistory.com/shorthistory.htm (last visited July 26, 2008).
Castlebar, the county's largest town and its administrative center, has a population of
about 10,700. http://www.mayo-ireland.ie[Mayo/Towns/CasBar/CasBar.htm (last visited
Dec. 22, 2008).
10 See infra Part III.B. and accompanying notes.
11 The Irish law of self-defense will be discussed infra in Part IV.
12 The population of Ireland is about 4,100,000 people. See https://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/print/ei.html (last visited July 29, 2008).
13 The Court of Criminal Appeal consists of a Judge of the Supreme Court and two
Judges of the High Court. It hears appeals from people convicted on indictments in the
Circuit or Central Criminal Courts after the appellant obtains a certificate from the trial
judge that the case is suitable for appeal. See http://www.courts.ie/courts.ie/library3.nsf/
pagecurrent/B68454B7DF792E6480256D8700502304; see also RAYMOND BYRNE & J.
7.38, 252 (4th ed. 2001).
e.g., The Reality Is That We Rate Some Lives Over Others, IRISH INDEPENDENT,

PAUL MCCUTCHEON, THE IRISH LEGAL SYSTEM §
14 See,

Dec. 16, 2007; John Downes et. al., Nally's Acquittal Brings Divided Response, IRISH
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The Nally shooting occurred in a rapidly changing environment in Ireland. During the past decade, Ireland had transformed
from a country with a lagging economy and persistent emigration
into the booming "Celtic Tiger. '1 5 This prosperity increased its
population as both immigrants and returning migrants filled its cities and expanded its suburbs. Its rural areas are shifting from
traditional agriculture to commuting communities with few members of the younger generation taking over the responsibilities of
the family farms. With these changes, new social problems have
arisen and existing prejudices have been reinforced.
Crimes and trials that involve ordinary people often galvanize
the public when the protagonists, their victims, their motives, and
the circumstances evoke extreme empathic reactions. When Goetz
repeatedly shot four black teenagers in the belief that they were
about to mug him, his acts were widely debated. Many people
frustrated by the high incidence of violent crime in that era hailed
him as a hero and considered his actions understandable, even
commendable. On the other hand, he was vilified as a racist and an
outlaw who literally jumped the gun, overreacted, and then lost
control. The case could not be discussed without addressing vigilantism, race, and close-to-the-surface feelings about black-onwhite crime that percolated at that time.
The Nally case offered a very similar narrative of two archetypes who collide-the accused, a sympathetic insider who could be
anyone's favorite uncle, and the victim, the sinister outsider whose
lifestyle would alienate most people-causing everyone else to
choose sides in the aftermath. In lieu of the urban American version of the subway vigilante who takes matters into his own hands,
Nally featured a familiar Irish folk figure, the hardworking, bachelor farmer living in isolation who bravely confronts a shady, good-

TIMES,

Dec. 16, 2006, at 1; Losses Suffered by All Far Outweigh Right or Wrong,
Oct. 12, 2007.

IRISH

INDEPENDENT,

15 "Ireland is a trade-dependent economy with growth averaging six percent in 19952006. Agriculture, once the most important sector, is now dwarfed by industry and services." See "Ireland" in CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK

(2008), available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/ei.html#Econ. Industry now accounts for twenty-seven percent of the labor force. Although exports remain
the primary engine for Ireland's growth, the economy has also benefited from a rise in
consumer spending, construction, and business investment. "Per capita GDP is 40% (forty
percent) above that of the four big European economies and the second highest in the
European Union behind Luxembourg." See id.
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for-nothing Traveller about to commit a crime.' 6 Their ensuing altercation riveted and divided Ireland, exposing longstanding
prejudices and, some argue, the law's inadequacies. The settings
and characters of the cases are different, but in the end, Nally provoked intense reactions in Ireland just as Goetz had in New York.
The Goetz case made a contribution to the interpretation of
the law of self-defense in New York State, generated considerable
scholarship, and has been described as the "tipping point" in New
York City's history, leading to a substantial reduction in crime. 17 It
also provoked resounding debates about the role of race in American criminal law, and continues to do so to this day. 18 Twenty years
later, while the case remains a heuristic for a less happy era, its
circumstances are largely divorced from today's vibrant New York
City where the subways are considered safe at all hours.' 9
The facts of the crime, the legal odyssey and the public debates surrounding D.P.P. v. Nally echo in Gaelic cadence 20 its
American predecessor. It is possible that the killing, the trials, and
the social conditions that it created may fade from memory as Ireland continues its rapid transformation from an agrarian to an urban country, and as family farms and their solitary occupants
vanish like the graffiti-ridden subways of New York City. But,
there are some signals that the Nally upheaval may inspire some
16 One neighbor described the community reaction:
None of us deserves in our lives to suddenly be newspaper material, but those
lovely, quiet, decent people are now part of folklore in a bad way. .... Padraig
Nally was a decent, quiet bachelor man, barely touched by the Celtic Tiger, one
of the last of the small farmers, trying to make a living off farming when there's
no living off farming. Are people like him now vulnerable ... to a more aggressive type of Traveller?
A Community on Edge, IRISH TIMES, July 23, 2005, at 4.
17 MALCOM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 133-68 (2000).
18 "How should the law respond when one person (D) kills another person (V), who is
black, because D believes that V is about to kill him, but D would not have so believed if V
had been white? The canonical case raising this question is People v. Goetz." Stephen P.
Garvey, Self-Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 NEW CRIM L. REV. 119 (2008).
19 Even though he received a six-month jail sentence, People v. Goetz, 73 N.Y.2d 751
(1988), and was successfully sued for damages by one of the victims, see infra note 79,
Goetz actually ran for a position in the City government in 2005. Andrea Peyser, Blast
from the Past. Goetz Reloads for Mayor Run in '05, N.Y. POST, Apr. 21, 2005, at 12.
20 Gaelic or Irish is a Celtic language spoken in mainly Ireland (tire). According to the
1996 census, 1.43 million people in Ireland claim to have some knowledge of Irish, 353,000
of whom speak it regularly. See http://www.omniglot.com/writing/irish.htm (last visited
July 1, 2008).
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reforms to Irish criminal law and legal practice, although there are
fewer visible changes in Ireland's relations with its Travellers.
III.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS V.

NALLY

This was quite an exceptional trial in which the people of
Ireland divided themselves on social lines, to put it at its lowest.
It was a highly emotional and fraught trial. It contained circumstances which I doubt were ever contemplated by judges who
had anything to do with previous lines of authority... exist[ing]
in this area.2 1

A.

The Facts

The basic facts about the killing were never in controversy.2 2
On an October afternoon, while Nally was alone at his farmhouse
listening to the radio, he heard a car pull into his driveway. When
he investigated, he found the decedent's adult son, Tom Ward, sit-

ting in the driver's seat of the car. When the son asked whether
Nally's white car was for sale, the farmer asked about Ward's
"mate" and was told he was around the back of the house. Nally
went looking for the second man, John Ward. When Nally saw him
pushing open the kitchen door, he went to a nearby shed and retrieved his single-barrel shotgun. Nally then shot Ward in the groin
and hand, although he later claimed that the gun discharged accidentally. Following this, Nally and Ward engaged in a "ferocious
physical struggle." Nally picked up a heavy piece of wood with
which he struck Ward repeatedly across the head and upper body.
During this struggle, which amounted to at least forty blows to his
head and body, Ward's arm was broken. By this time, Tom Ward,
John's adult son, had left the farm house in their car. Nally later
said that he was concerned that Tom had gone for reinforcements.
After this beating, John Ward limped away from Nally's property, alone on the public road. Nally returned to the shed to reload
the shotgun then followed him. After that, he fired twice more
from a distance of between twelve and fifteen feet. The second
Remarks of Mr. Justice Paul Carney at the conclusion of the first trial, See Nally
[2006] C.C.A. 128 (Ir.) at 10. He also is reported to have said that this was the most
difficult case on which he had worked during his fourteen year career as a judge of the
Central Criminal Court. Liberty, But Sharp Debate Will Rumble on for Years, IRISH INDE21

Dec. 15, 2006.
22 This account paraphrases the statement of facts in the judgment of the Court of

PENDENT,

Criminal Appeal. See Nally [20061, C.C.A. 128 passim.
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shot in Ward's back was fatal. Nally, realizing that he had killed
Ward, picked up his body and threw it into an adjoining field. He
then called the Garda, the Irish police.
B.

The Traveller Community

The killing exposed the longstanding, quite overt animosity of
many Irish toward Travellers, an itinerant Irish ethnic group with a
separate identity, language, culture and history.2 3 There are approximately 30,000 Travellers living in the Republic of Ireland, representing about one percent of the population. Another 1,500 live
in Northern Ireland, and 10,000 live in the United States. Although they are as fully Irish as the majority population, unlike the
Roma or gypsies in other parts of Europe, they are marginalized
and ostracized-the victims of "ubiquitous prejudice. ' ' 24 The Irish
Government, however, refuses to recognize the Travellers as a distinct ethnic group since they do not differ from the majority population in terms of race, color, descent or national origin." Thus,
23 The factual information about the Traveller community in this section is drawn
largely from Pavee Point, a human rights organization. See http://www.paveepoint.ie (last
visited July 29, 2008). See also JANE HELLEINER,
POLITICS OF CULTURE (2000); THE STRANGER

IRISH TRAVELLERS: RACISM AND THE
IN

OURSELVES:

IRELAND'S

OTHERS

(Michael 0 hAodha, David O'Donnell, & Colm Power, eds. 2007); Angelique Chrisafis,
Ireland's Nomads Expose a Racial Divide, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 26, 2005; Christina
Coruth, Irish Travellers, Ireland's Minority Culture (2002), http://mi.essortment.com/irish
travellersryjv.htm.
24 See Irish Traveller Movement Expresses Shock at Verdict in Padraig Nally Retrial,
http://www.itmtrav.com/publications/PRNallycase.html.
25 See Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social
Rights, Initial Reports Submitted by State Partiesunder Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant,
Addendum: Ireland, U.N. Economic and Social Council, 12th Sess. 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/
1990/5/Add.34 (1999), 1[ 19-21, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,
CESCR,,IRL,4562d8b62,3f6ca3dc4,0.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2008). This raises concerns
that Travellers will not be able to avail themselves of human rights protections accorded by
treaty to ethnic minorities. See Irish Human Rights Commission, Travellers as an Ethnic
Minority under the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:A Discussion
Paper (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.ihrc.ie/_fileupload/misc/Travellersdiscussion-paper.doc. See also David Keane, International Law and the Ethnicity of Irish Travelers, 11 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC L.J. 43 (2005). Today, Travellers are included

specifically in anti-discrimination provisions of the Equal Status Act. Equal Status Act,
2000 (Act No. 8/2000) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2000/en/act/pub/
0008/index.html (last visited July 23, 2008). See HELLEINER, supra note 23, at 226-41.
Membership in the traveling community also is listed along with "race, colour, nationality,
religion, ethnic or national origins ...[and] sexual orientation" as a group protected by
hate crime legislation. Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989 (Act No. 19/1989)
(Ir.), available at http:llwww.irishstatutebook.iel1989/en/act/publOO19/index.html (last visited July 23, 2008).

2009]

THE GAELIC GOETZ

discrimination against Travellers officially is not treated as a form
of racism or even ethnic bias.2 6
Travellers are indigenous to Ireland and, by some accounts,
date back as far as the twelfth century.2 7 In the past, Travellers,
who often were tinsmiths by trade and thus known as Tinkers, now
a derogatory term, moved about in horse drawn caravans. Today,
their vehicles are mobile homes and trailers, but they often live
"settled" in halting sites. Travellers are largely uneducated and unemployed, live in substandard caravans without government housing subsidies, and suffer from many economic and social barriers.
They have an above-average infant mortality rate.
As itinerants, Travellers are stereotyped as shiftless, cunning,
and idle, living off their wits instead of following traditional social
norms of home and work. Consummate outsiders, they have been
cast as both untrustworthy and sly, and, more recently, as objects
of pity in need of rehabilitation. Some commentators describe the
' 2s
Travellers as victims of "overpolicing and underprotection.
Others make even stronger claims that describe the prejudice
29
against Travellers as a form of "caste-like apartheid.
John Ward fit the negative Traveller stereotype of poverty,
criminality, and unemployment. A forty-three-year-old father of
eleven, his family lived at a Travellers' "halting site" in Galway.
He had a number of previous convictions for burglary and larceny
offences and a violent disposition. 30 He made his livelihood in recycling, collecting scrap metal to sell, as do many Travellers.
C.
1.

The Legal Odyssey
The First Trial-Nally I

Nally was prosecuted in the Central Criminal Court in
Castlebar, the administrative centre of County Mayo. 3 1 This in it26 Rory O'Connell, The Right to Participationof Minoritiesand Irish Travellers, 6 STUD.
ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM 6
27 HELLEINER, supra note 23,

(2006).

at 32-50.
28 Aogan Mulcahy, Travellers are Being Left to Feel Over-Policedand Under-Protected,

IRISH TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at 18.
29 O'Connell, supra note 26, at 5 (quoting MICHAEL MACGREIL, PREJUDICE IN IRELAND REVISITED 341 (1996)).
30 Following the verdict, it was revealed that there had been two unexecuted bench
warrants for Ward's arrest during the weeks before his killing. Two Arrest Warrants Were
Out on Traveller Shot Dead by Nally, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at 4.

31 The High Court consists of the President and thirty-five ordinary judges. The High
Court has full jurisdiction in and power to determine all matters and questions whether of
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self was unusual. A local Circuit Court usually has jurisdiction
over most criminal matters, but serious cases of murder, rape, aggravated sexual assault, treason, and piracy customarily are prosecuted in the Central Criminal Court in Dublin regardless of where
the crime occurs. Since 2004, the Court has conducted some trials
outside of Dublin but the effort to expand the presence of the Central Criminal Court more locally has been quite limited. The Nally
case was the first serious crime to be tried in Castlebar.
a.

The Evidence

Most of the evidence was undisputed. The jury heard both
Nally's admission that he intended to kill Ward and the forensic
evidence about the bludgeoning inflicted on Ward. The jury also
heard about how Nally loaded and then reloaded his shotgun, discharging nearly forty rounds, finally hitting Ward fatally in the
back.32
Nally claimed self-defense as a householder. To support this
claim, Nally and his sister described prior burglaries in recent
months at homes of some of his neighbors. Some of his own property also had been pilfered. Nally was described as "obsessed"
with other local crimes, especially an incident in which two brothers were tied up in their home and left to die several years earlier.
His behavior became increasingly eccentric. He would sit outside
his shed with his shotgun across his knees, writing down license
numbers of suspicious looking cars. He put water on the clay path
at his gate to preserve footprints. His sister had started staying
with Nally on the weekends due to his anxieties and he began to
have difficulty sleeping. He claimed to be "out of his mind with
worry. '3 3 After his arrest, he also made a statement to the Garda
that "When I got up yesterday morning, I knew something was going to happen ... I had a premonition. I had a good idea this was
law or fact, civil or criminal, and to the constitutionality of any law. When the High Court
exercises its criminal jurisdiction, it is known as the Central Criminal Court and consists of
a judge or judges of the High Court. See http://www.courts.ie/Courts.ie/library3.nsf/Page
CurrentWebLookUpTop Nav/The%20Courts (last visited July 30, 2008).
32 At the conclusion of a criminal trial, an Irish judge typically summarizes the evidence
in addition to directing the jury on point of law. BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 13,
at 237 . At the trial, Judge Carney's summary comprised forty-five pages of the record.
The facts detailed in this section are drawn from the Transcript of Jury Instructions in
D.P.P. v. Nally, pp. 77-122 [hereinafter Transcript] (on file with author).
33 Tom Shiel, Bachelor Farmer Describes Lead Up to Killing, IRISH TIMES, July 15,
2005, at 2.
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going to happen." And then he34 described the struggle with Ward
as "[a] real movie-type effort.

As the trial progressed, the testimony and ensuing news coverage strongly sympathized with Nally." The details of his simple
and completely recognizable life are reminiscent to many Irishmen
of their own rural relatives. He lived in the same country house in
which he was raised, and where, having left school to return to the
family farm, he now lived alone without a phone, near a salmon
stream. Described as "not an ostentatious man," his modest car
was fifteen years old and his tractor bought second-hand almost
twenty years before. His sister said he was no longer outgoing, but
instead depressed and growing more anxious and fearful.
Neighbors testified about Nally's general reputation as a trustworthy gentleman. Always greeting passers-by with a smile, he
was known as honest and kind. Further testimony revealed the
quotidian details of the morning before the shooting down to food
on the table and the program on the radio when Nally heard
Ward's car arrive.
Witnesses also described a changing rural Ireland, where farmhouses were unoccupied during the day because their owners now
worked in town, and the ensuing increased insecurity and
jitteriness.
Nally's admission to the Garda that he had intended to kill
Ward was revealed to the jury. At the trial, however, he modified
this damaging statement by claiming to be protecting his property.
His explanation for reloading the shotgun and continuing to fire
was that "his mind had gone entirely." At trial, Nally said he
reloaded the gun with the thought of taking his own life.
Two psychiatrists who had treated Ward also testified for the
defense that Ward had a difficult temper and a history of fighting.
Evidence was introduced that he had a pending court date to answer charges of threatening a man with a hook.36
b.

The Jury

Responsibility for jury selection for the Circuit Criminal
Courts rests with the County Registrar in each of the twenty-six
counties, whereas juries for the Central Criminal Court are called
34

Id.

35 See, e.g., The Pressure Had Got to Me, IRIsH TIMES, July 16, 2005, at 3.
36 What Drove a Shy, Kind Man to Kill?, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 12, 2005, at 3.
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in Dublin. Although the Central Criminal Court had begun to
hear murder cases outside of Dublin, this innovation was relatively
rare, so it was notable that such a case where feelings ran so high
would be tried locally. 37 The notoriety of this case made this break
from the norm particularly controversial, since the jury pool was
drawn from the same rural community in which Nally lived and
where a fairly significant Traveller population roamed looking for
salvage and work. A local jury was presumed favorable to Nally
and there were no Travellers empanelled.3 s
c. The Jury Instructions
In an "unusual development, '39 the prosecution requested the
trial judge to rule that the jury be given a truncated version of selfdefense in light of the evidence that the force used was so excessive
that it could not be viewed as objectively reasonable. The facts
were uncontroverted that a greatly incapacitated Ward had left
Nally's farm and was shot on the road at a time when Nally could
himself have retreated to safety.
The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that it could consider a full self-defense claim in light of the evidence. Instead, he
allowed a partial defense that could reduce the admitted killing
from murder to a manslaughter-based doctrine in Ireland called
"excessive defence." In the salient portion of the jury directions,
the judge stated:
Now self-defence permits of two different terms of defence.
This is what is known as full self-defence, and where full selfdefence operates, there is no crime at all. A person is entitled to
use reasonable force to defend his life and to defend somebody
else's life, and if the force was reasonable having regard to all
the circumstances then even thought there was a killing and
even though there was a deliberate killing, there is no crime
37 Ireland permits both cause and peremptory challenges so that anyone with an interest in or connection to the case could be subject to challenge. Juries Act of 1976, sec. 20-21
(Act No. 4/1976) (Ir.), available at http://www.smallclaimsonline.ie/Courts.ie/Library3.nsf/
(WebFiles)/FA4DA65A42DA9CD6802570440034EC30/$FILE/Juries%2OAct,%201976.
pdf. Unlike in the U.S., potential jurors are not questioned by counsel and very little juror
information is elicited in the selection process. Katie Quinn, Jury Trials in the Republic of
Ireland, 72 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT P8NAL 197, 205 (2001); BYRNE & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 13 § 6.134, at 236.
38 What Chance Has a Traveller Before an Irish Jury?, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at 15
(describing both juries as "Irish" and "a body of 12 Irish men and women" presumably
signaling the absence of Travellers).
39 Nally [2006] C.C.A. 128, at T 4.
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committed. Now I have ruled in your absence that, on the facts
of this case, a finding that the force used to kill John Ward was
reasonable and necessary to the degree that no crime at all was
committed and that it was totally and entirely justified would be
a perverse finding, and it is not open to me to allow matters to
go to you which I rule as a matter of law are perverse...
Now that ruling on my part is not the end of the matter because
the law goes on to say that if the force used was excessive, but it
was no more than the accused man considered necessary, then it
is not murder, it is manslaughter. As I said, you apply the subjective test. In other words, you assess the state of belief that
would operate having regard to his obsession, to his lifestyle, to
his baggage, to his history. a
With this instruction, the judge withheld from the jury the option of finding Nally fully justified, and therefore, of acquitting him
on this ground. However, a defense request for an instruction on
provocation was granted. 4 1 Thus, the jury could reach a guilty verdict of murder or of manslaughter on either a theory of partial defense or provocation. Nothing in these instructions, however,
expressed or implied that the jury did not have its usual powers to
acquit the defendant either because of a deficiency in the prosecution's evidence or notwithstanding evidence of guilt.
d.

The Verdict and Sentence

Nally was convicted of manslaughter in July 2005.42 In November, he was sentenced to six years in jail. The verdict and sentence were criticized by Ward's family and supporters for its
leniency,4 3 and met with anger and protests by Nally's. 44 Some
legislators seized the moment to call for new laws ensuring a home40 Transcript, supra note 32, at 72-73, quoting from but not citing People v. (A.G.) v.

Christopher Dwyer [1972] I.R. 416 (Ir.). A failure to instruct the jury on this defense when
supported by evidence would be reversible error. See, e.g., D.P.P. v. O'Carroll [2004] 3
I.R. 531 (It.).
41 Id., at 74-77.
42 Nally, [2006] C.C.A. 128, at T 2. The jury took a little more than two hours to reach
its verdict. Steve Bird, Farmer Living in Fear Shot Traveller Dead, TIMESONLINE, July 21,
2005, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tollnews/uk/article546294.ece.
43 Lorna Siggins, Dead Traveller's Wife Unhappy with Trial Verdict, IRISH TIMES, July

23, 2005, at 3.
44 Nally's friends and family had anticipated a much shorter, or even suspended, sentence. Kathy Sheridan, Judge Tells of 'Most Socially Divisive' Case, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 12,
2006, at 1. A controversial rally was postponed in favor of less confrontational efforts and
because it was widely perceived as anti-Traveller. Lorna Siggins, Travellers Welcome Decision to Postpone Nally Rally, IRISH

TIMES,

Nov. 18, 2006, at 2. Nally's supporters also
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owner's right to use deadly force,45 but were criticized for opportunism. 46 Nally's effort to reduce his sentence was rebuffed, giving
Judge Carney an opportunity to say again, "[t]he killing was unlaw47
ful and could not be regarded as anything else under the law."
The verdict raised legal problems almost immediately, presaging the concerns of the appellate court. Soon after the verdict, during an application for leave to appeal, Judge Carney was
"considerably vexed" that the prosecutor had not made him aware
of a decision that stands for the notion that there is a "right for the
jury to be wrong. '48 Indeed, having been made aware of these authorities after the verdict, Judge Carney, "Ireland's most famous
and colourful judge, ' 49 remonstrated the prosecutor for creating
this problem while insulating himself from criticism:
Now, that judgment [referring to the precedent in D.P.P.v. Davis] obviously has caused me great difficulty in this case.5" It
was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court (and) was not
opened to me, so I was not able to consider matters in the light
of it. I don't accept [the prosecutor's] suggestion that even an
experienced trial judge at the end of such a fraught trail is going
to have bubbling at the top of his mind everything that the superior court might have said a decade ago.51

established a fund to help maintain his farm and organized a Christmas card-writing campaign to send cards to his prison. Support Group for Farmer, IRISH NEWS, Dec. 10, 2005.
45 Mark Brennock, Kenny Calls for Change in Law on Defending Homes, IRISH TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2006, at 9.
46 Michael O'Regan, Exploitation of Nally Case Raised, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at
8; Travellers Take FG [Fine Gael Political Party] to Task Over Stance on Nally, IRISH
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2005, at 9.
47 Nally Manslaughter Conviction Appeal Refused, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 6, 2005, at 4.
48 Nally, [2006] C.C.A. 128, at
23. See D.P.P. v. Mark Davis [1993] 2 I.R. 1 (Ir.).
49 Final Verdict on Year in Court, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Jan. 2, 2007, available at http://
www.independent.ie/national-news/final-verdict-on-year-in-court-57442.html.
50 The judge is reported as having said that this was the most difficult sentencing of his
fourteen years on the bench. Nally Judgment, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 12, 2005, at 15; Farmer
Gets Six Years for Shooting Traveller, IRISH NEWS, Nov. 12, 2005, at 17.
51 Quoted in Nally [2006] C.C.A. 128 at 10. Later, the appellate court also chastened
trial counsel, particularly the prosecution, for failing to submit adequate written authorities
to assist the trial judge's formulation of the jury instructions. Attributing the failure to the
setting of the trial, the appeals court magnanimously observed that the location of the trial,
"proculab urbe-far from the city-[created] circumstances where the marshalling of written
legal authorities may have posed certain practical difficulties." Nally [2006] C.C.A. 128 at
7.

2009]

THE GAELIC GOETZ
2.

The Appeal

On October 12, 2006, the Court of Criminal Appeal ["CCA"]
quashed the conviction, directing a new trial.51 The self-defense
instruction quoted above was the principal issue on appeal: Given

the facts of the case, is the trial judge entitled to direct the jury, in
effect, to bring in a verdict of guilty of either murder or manslaughter, and deprive them of the ability to acquit?5 3
Although in Irish courts (as well as those in the United Kingdom), traditionally a judge may express an opinion about particu-

lar facts and even possible verdicts, 54 a judge cannot direct the jury
to find the accused guilty.5 5 This well-settled rule is of constitutional dimension in Ireland, so an instruction that directs a jury to
return a guilty verdict is "an unconstitutional usurpation of the
jury's function" and violates the right to trial by jury. 6 This result
was grounded in part on the longstanding principle that juries have

the power to acquit even if such a result would be, as Judge Carney
noted, "perverse."5 7 By instructing that they had only two options-murder, or the lesser crime of manslaughter if they believed

that force was necessary to avert an attack, but the amount of force
employed excessive-Judge Carney improperly divested the jury of

its power to acquit. Thus, while a judge may direct a verdict of not
52 Criminal appeals from the Central Criminal Court are heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal, a court consisting of three judges drawn from the High Court and the Supreme
Court. See Irish Courts Service, available at http://www.courts.ie/courts.ie/library3.nsfl
pagecurrent/B68454B7DF792E6480256D8700502304?opendocument&l=EN (last visited
July 1, 2008).
53 Nally, [2006] C.C.A. 128, at 1 10.
54 "It is open to a judge in an appropriate case to express an opinion that a particular
verdict of guilty is the only one which would be reasonable or proper on the evidence, but
that must of necessity fall short of the right to direct a verdict of guilty." D.P.P. v. Mark
Davis [1993] 2 I.R. at 14-15.
55 In any appropriate case... the judge may sum up in such a way as to make it
plain that he considers that the accused in guilty and should be convicted. I
doubt however whether the most effective way of doing so would be for the
judge to tell the jury that it would be perverse for them to acquit.
R. v. Wang, 1 WLR 661 [2005](H.L.) (U.K.); Byrne & McCutcheon, supra note 13, at 237
(describing anecdotal evidence of reversals because of "overly robust" directions by the
trial judge).
56 GERARD HOGAN & GERRY WHYTE, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 658 (1994).
57 In D.P.P. v. Clarke, [1994] 3 I.R. 289 (Ir.), when instructing on the "Dwyer option,"
the trial court said: "While the verdict is open to you, ladies and gentleman, and you could
in theory acquit him of all responsibility, I say it appears to me that the facts ... hardly
admit of the possibility of an acquittal ....
" This instruction was roundly criticized by the
appeals court: "To say to a jury that something is only theoretically possible is in effect to
invite them not to consider it at all ...." Id.
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guilty in order to prevent a wrongful conviction, there is no reciprocal power to direct a verdict of guilty so that any instruction that
implies that the jury has no option to acquit is reversible error.5"
The jury's absolute right to decide the issue of guilt or innocence encompasses the power of the jury to deliver a verdict that
might conflict with the views of the trial judge. Therefore, the factual question of whether Nally acted in self-defense was to be answered by the jury, including whether the force he used was
reasonable or excessive. Judge Carney could have told the jury
that he did not believe that the amount of force used in the case
fell within the limits of the law of self-defense. The jury then could
assess that view along with the evidence but, even knowing this
opinion, would retain the final power to return a not guilty verdict
notwithstanding the evidence or the judge's assessment. Instead
the CCA said,
This Court has little doubt but that had the prosecution allowed
this trial to proceed in the usual manner, the learned trial judge
would have given appropriate directions to the jury in the usual
form. That usual form would have enabled the trial judge [sic]
express his opinion that the amount of force used could not in
his view be objectively justified in the context of the defence of
self-defence, but would have left the ultimate decision on that
issue to the jury.59
Because the CCA held that the Nally instructions usurped the
jury's function, the Court ordered a new trial. Nally was freed
from jail where he had been serving his six-year prison sentence. A
request by the defense to conduct the retrial in County Mayo was
denied.6"
INTERMISSION

This was the story I heard about one month after arriving in
Ireland when, after the mid-October 2006 remand, the case was
again in the news. I watched a tape of the RTE program about
the case that aired in November 2005, just a few days after the
sentence. On the show Nally was interviewed in his farmhouse
giving his side of the story, and there was a staged reenactment
of the crime. 61 John Ward's son and wife were also on the pro58 Davis, supra note 48; see also Wang, supra note 55.
59 Nally, [2006] C.C.A. 128 at S 10.
60 Date Set for Murder Trial, IRISH NEWS, Oct. 24, 2006, at 11.

61 See http://www.rte.ie/news/2005/111l/index.html, Nov. 11, 2005.
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gram. To my untutored eyes, the show was biased toward Nally.
Nevertheless, given the sequence of events, and the fact that Ireland recognizes an imperfect self-defense, a manslaughter conviction seemed spot-on and to be the obvious outcome even if
the jury had been instructed properly on self-defense.
3.

The Second Trial-Nally II

The retrial, now for manslaughter in light of the verdict at the
first trial, was moved to the Central Criminal Courts in Dublin.
During jury selection on the first day, Judge Carney cautioned the
jury of four women and eight men to disregard the publicity and
public debate about the case.62 Mr. Justice Kevin O'Higgins presided over the remainder of the second trial. The trial lasted only a
few days. Its evidence was largely identical to the first trial, including ballistics testimony that forty spent cartridges had been recovered and that both shots were fired within five yards. At this trial,
the jury also was allowed to learn that Ward had a large number of
previous criminal convictions.63 Dramatically, during the trial,
Nally suffered chest pains and was rushed to hospital, temporarily
delaying the case.6 4

The second jury was permitted to consider whether Nally acted in self-defense.65 The jurors deliberated for between fifteen
and eighteen hours (news accounts66differ), requiring two nights at a
hotel, and found Nally not guilty.
62 Stern Warning to Jurors-Ignore All the Hype, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 5, 2006,

available at http://www.independent.ie/national-news/stern-warning-to-jurors-ignore-allthe-hype-63036.html.
63 Ward is reported as having eighty previous convictions. See John Downes, Kathy
Sheridan, Miriam Donohoe & Lorna Siggins, Nally's Acquittal Brings Divided Response,
IRISH TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at 1.
64 Nally Case on Hold as He Suffers Chest Pain, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 9, 2006,

available at http://www.independent.ie/national-news/nally-case-on-hold-as-he-sufferschest-pain-63775.html.
65 The proceedings of the second trial and its jury instructions were not transcribed
since there was no appeal. Despite my repeated requests, the Court graciously, but firmly,
refused to provide a transcript to me, even at my own cost. Email from Geraldine Manners, Registrar, Court of Criminal Appeal, to Stacy Caplow, Professor of Law, Brooklyn
Law School (Apr. 30, 2007, 10:32 EST) (on file with author). Nor did news accounts describe the jury instructions, unfortunately. Given the basis for the reversal, the basic difference between the instructions at the retrial presumably was an additional instruction on
the complete self-defense that accompanied the instructions given at the first trial on murder, and manslaughter on a theory of both excessive force (as in Dwyer, [1972] I.R. 416
(Ir.)) and provocation.
66 The instructions at the second trial were described as "stern" and, when combined
with the prior conviction, likely to lead to a manslaughter verdict, so it was surprising that
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67
The Reaction: "Innocent, but Hardly a Hero

Emotions ran high after the acquittal, reflecting a bitter division of opinion.68 Nally supporters expressed relief that his ordeal
was over. Nally himself was surprised, but perhaps even a bit confounded by the verdict. 69 His most public reaction expressed his
hope of getting his family shotgun back from the police.7 °
Some in the Traveller community responded with bitterness
and accusations of racism,7 1 expressing despair about their future.7 z
that "we regard some
Others commented that the verdict 7proved
3
lives as more precious than others.
The media reported the conflicting reactions of Nally supporters' denials that Traveller prejudice was involved, and the contrasting "stunned" reaction of Traveller groups that Nally was
acquitted.7 1 Some media commented that the law itself was outdated by allowing so few options other than acquittal as a means
for expressing compassion in the form of mitigation for a killer.75
John Ward's widow filed a wrongful death lawsuit against
Nally. Although such claims are unusual in Ireland, reportedly
the deliberations lasted so long. What Chance Has a Traveller Offender Before an Irish
Jury?, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at 15; Tears as Nally is Cleared of Killing, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 15, 2006; Louise Hogan, Farmer Cleared of Killing, IRISH NEWS LIMITED,
Dec. 15, 2006, at 6.
67 Declared Innocent, But Hardly a Hero of Our Times, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec, 15,
2006.
68 See Downes et al., supra note 63; Declared Innocent, But Hardly a Hero of Our
Times, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec, 15, 2006; Liberty, But Sharp Debate Will Rumble on for
Years, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 15, 2006; Implications of Nally Verdict, IRISH TIMES, Dec.
16, 2006.
69 See Nally Comments on His Acquittal, RTE NEWS, Dec. 15, 2006, http://www.ret.ie/
news/2006/1215/nallyp.html.
70 Nally Wants Gun Used to Kill Traveller Given Back, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 21,
2006.
71 Travellers Hold Vigil to Protest Nally's Acquittal, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 20, 2006;
Irish Traveller Movement Expresses Shock at Verdict in PadraigNally Retrial, http://itmtrav.
com/publications/PRNallycase.html.
72 Time to Stop Apologizing, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at 17.
73 The Reality Is That We Rate Some Lives Over Others, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 16,
2006.
74 See, e.g., RTE NEWS, http://rte.ie/news/2006/1215/nallyp.html (last visited Nov. 23,
2008).
75 Editorial, Nally Case and the Law, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 16, 2006, available at
http://www.independent.ie/opinion/editorial/nally-case-and-the-law-64711.html;
Juries
Have Few Options-It's Time to Overhaul Homicide Laws, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 16,
2006, available at http://www.independent.ie/national-news/Juries-have-few-options-itstime-to-overhaul-homicide-laws-64824.html.
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they are on the rise, particularly in cases in which a controversial
acquittal occurs.7 6 In another twist of fate, Nally's son, John Jr.,
who had been in the car on the fateful day, was convicted of assault
and sentenced to prison for having stabbed another man three
times.

IV.

EXCESSIVE FORCE:

A

UNIQUELY IRISH DEFENSE

When Padraig Nally committed a "crime of self-defense ' ' 7 his
actions awakened many of the factual and normative debates imbedded in the law's allowance of lethal force in self-defense. Like
Goetz before him, Nally's perceptions and conduct were ambiguous and questionable, bumping up uncomfortably against the already difficult measurements required in such cases.
Because a successful claim of self-defense results in complete
acquittal, the defense succeeds only if the individual acts with the
intention of deflecting an attack by appropriate means. This requires an examination of the accused's state-of-mind at that time of
the response-what did the actor know or believe to be happening,
and did he react within appropriate boundaries? Subject to modern modifications in particular statutes, these basic elements are
part of the legal tradition of both the United States and Ireland,
and both countries derive their fundamental principles from British
common law.79
In short, a person whose life, physical safety or property is imminently threatened has the right to use the least amount of force
necessary to avoid the attack. Looking at these traditional elements, the self-defense claims asserted in both the Nally and Goetz
cases seem legally dubious, and to anyone placing a bet on an acquittal, that verdict would have been a long shot.80 History proves
this would have been a losing wager.
76 Nally Sued for 'Blood Money' Over Shooting, IRISH

INDEPENDENT,

Feb. 6, 2007,

available at http://www.independent.ie/national-news/nally-sued-for-blood-money-overshooting-53473.html.
77 Ann Healy, Ward Son Gets Three Years for Knife Attack on Friend, IRISH TIMES, July

18, 2007, at 4.
78 With appreciation to FLETCHER, supra note 2.
79 See generally FINBARR MCAULEY & J. PAUL MCCUTCHEON, CRIMINAL LIABILITY
733-43 (2000) (tracing the history of lawful defensive force in Irish and English common
law) and PAUL H. ROBINSON, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES (1984).

80 From the very time of his arrest, Nally asserted that he acted in self-defense when he
admitted to intentionally killed Ward. He principally feared for his life but the facts of the
case also imply a claim that he was protecting his home and farm property as much as his
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Even if it were possible to accept their respective explanations
for their fear, and even if those explanations were both credible
and reasonable from the defendants' perspectives, the two lethal
shots fired by Nally as an injured John Ward ran down the road
would cause any observer, including a properly instructed juror to
doubt the claim of self-defense. This is equally true of the extra
shots fired at one of Goetz's victims (who was crippled as a result
of the incident) while he was seated, incapacitated and displaying
person. He attributed his response to his growing fear of living in isolation and others
described this fear as eccentricity or even paranoia. Transcript,supra note 32, at 108-13.
Goetz had cast his behavior in similar terms, using a metaphor of a cornered rat provoked
by repeated assaults into becoming a "vicious killer." Fletcher, supra note 2, at 13. The
chart below compares the facts of each case in the context of the legal elements of the
various possible justification claims:

Nally

Goetz

Threat

From two people at isolated farm:
one in car, one on property,
recognized as Travellers
To personal safety and home
A person seen coming out of house
No visible weapon
No direct verbal threat
No weapon recovered
Alone

From four people: in crowded
subway car during day, AfricanAmerican
Of robbery or physical violence
Two people approached, asked for
money
No visible weapon
No direct verbal threat
Screwdrivers recovered from three
people

Imminence

Already disabled attacker by beating
and gun shot
Shot attacker in back while injured
and running away

Other possible attackers farther
away
Fired some shots after disabling
individuals

Aggressor

Gun in home, used to injure then
kill
Injured and disabled victim by
hitting repeatedly with wood stick
Reloaded gun

Carrying unlicensed loaded weapon
on person in subway

Necessity

Attacker no longer on property,
running away
Second trespasser no longer in
vicinity
Went inside home, came out again
(opportunity to retreat)

Some shots at close range
Other shots after moved farther
down the subway car
Moving subway (no opportunity to
retreat)

Force Used

Deadly and fatal
Multiple shots in back to already
injured assailant

Deadly but non-fatal
Multiple shots at each victim
Wounds all four

Mental State

Admits intent to kill
Claims loss of control

Admits intent to kill
Claims loss of control

Charges

Murder

Attempted Murder
Assault
Reckless Endangerment
Possession of Weapon
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no weapon.8 1 It is this portion of the story that gives rise to impression that the jury acquitted notwithstanding the evidence.
It is also this portion of the story that introduces the plea of
excessive force, a stubbornly tenacious feature of Irish law.
A.

TraditionalElements of Self-Defense

Classic common law self-defense doctrine focuses both on the
threat that elicits responsive force, and the nature of the response
itself. First, the triggering event, an attack on the person or property, must be imminent. Second, the response must be necessary
and proportionateto the attack itself.8 2 The use of force is not lawful once the threat is over either because the attacker has withdrawn or the attack can be avoided by some other less violent
means. Nor is the use of force lawful if more force is used than
reasonably would be required to ward off the attack. Self-defense,
therefore, is a doctrine of conflict avoidance which requires the actor to use minimal force in reaction to a threat of harm. Thus,
deadly force is warranted only when responding to an equally serious threat of death or great bodily injury. 3
The self-defense claim calls for an examination of two distinct
aspects of the actor's knowledge. First, the actor must have a reasonable belief that he or she is being threatened with force and that
responsive force is necessary to avert the attack. Historically, this
belief was measured by a purely objective yardstick, but in modern
times, the standard has become subjectivized, allowing for inquiry
into the context and circumstances of the individual.8 4 The belief
still must be assessed in the context of reasonableness, taking into
account these more individual personal factors.8 5 Second, in addi81 Ten years later, Darrell Cabey sued Goetz and won a huge verdict. Adam Nossiter,
Bronx Jury Orders Goetz to Pay Man He Paralyzed $43 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1996,
at Al.
82 DAVID ORMEROD, SMITH & HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 329-30 (11th ed. 2005); PETER
CHARLETON, PAUL ANTHONY McDERMOTr, & MARGUERITE BOLGER, CRIMINAL LAW

1040 (1999); 2 ROBINSON, supra note 79, § 121, at 2-7. Proportionality is a component of
necessity. Since lawful force is bounded by necessity, using more force than necessary
would be a prioriexcessive.
83 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 540-41 (4th ed. 2003).
84 This was the very issue in Goetz, 68 N.Y. 2d at 114-15, in which the New York State
Court of Appeals adopted a modified objective standard to allow the defense to introduce
into evidence prior experiences, such as an earlier mugging, that might explain the reasonableness of his belief in the imminent attack.
85 The minority view expressed in the Model Penal Code § 3.04(1) appears to be wholly
subjective, requiring only that the "actor believes" the use of force is necessary.
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tion to believing that responsive force is warranted, the actor must
only use as much force as reasonably necessary in relation to the
attack itself.
In this calculus, there are two possible loci for error or mistake: the actor may incorrectly perceive the threat and/or may
overestimate how much force is required. Common law has grappled with the effect that an error in judgment about the circumstances should have on the availability of the defense and
fashioned a compromise: an honest yet reasonable mistake about
the threat itself would not preclude the full defense in the U.S. 86 In
England, even an unreasonable mistake about the threatened harm
could exculpate entirely.8 7 A few U.S. jurisdictions also recognize
a qualified defense, often called an "imperfect defense," that gives
the jury the option of convicting for manslaughter in the event of
an honest, but unreasonable mistake about the necessity of responsive force.88
Problems arise, however, when an actor miscalculates and resorts to a level of force that is not reasonably related to the threat
because the force was either excessive or the threat was over. 89
86 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 79, § 184(b), at 399-402; LAFAVE, supra note 83, at 542.
Section 3.04(1) of the Model Penal Code leads to a somewhat contrary result. An unreasonable mistake might result in a conviction of a reckless or negligent crime. MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 3.09.

87 Beckford v. R., (1988) A.C. 130 (U.K.).
88 LAFAVE, supra note 83, § 10.4(i), at 550, cases cited at n. 88; AM. JUR. HOMICIDE
§ 139 (2008); 3 A.L.R. 6th 543 (2005); 42 AM. JUR. TRIALS 151, § 22.5 (2008). In California, an unreasonable mistake about the imminence of danger negates the malice required
for murder. People v. Manriquez, 36 Cal. Rptr.3d 340, 37 Cal. App.4th 457 (2005), cert.
denied 126 S.Ct. 2359 (2006). See Note, Janet Grumer, Developments in California Homicide Law: IX. Self-Defense, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1575 (2003). The doctrine is recognized
in other states. See, e.g., Thomas v. Maryland, 143 Md. App. 97, 113-14, 792 A.2d 368
(2002). Some homicide statutes codify the imperfect defense. See, e.g., Utah Code § 76-5205(1)(c). The doctrine of imperfect self-defense also has been applied when a defendant
would have had the right of self-defense but for an act of initial aggression, but not if
excessive force was employed. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bock, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4020, *16
(N.D. Mich. 2006).
Interestingly, a few New York intermediate appellate courts have reduced a murder
conviction to manslaughter when the defendant's justification defense was imperfect, finding a lack of intent to kill. See, e.g., People v. Alamo, 128 A.D.2d 441,443 (1st Dep't 1987)
(although the defendant fired seven times, jury could have found defendant's intent was to
injure not kill); People v. Cox, 203 A.D.2d 7, 7-8 (1st Dep't 1994) (although defendant used
excessive force beyond necessary self-defense, prosecution failed to prove intent to kill
rather than to seriously injure).
89 Courts in Commonwealth countries such as Australia and India have addressed this
issue with a range of results. See M. Sornarajah, Excessive Self-Defense in Commonwealth
Law, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 758 (1972); see infra Part IV.C.
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The rules are less forgiving in these circumstances because it is assumed that anyone acting in self-defense believes that the amount
of responsive force was essential, otherwise the conduct would
amount to an intentional killing based on revenge. Thus, if the actor knows that the degree of force being used is unnecessary either
because the threat is no longer imminent or because less force will
suffice to avoid harm, his intent is no longer defensive but rather
aggressive or vengeful, so the defense fails.
The assessment of whether responsive force is reasonably related to the harm threatened is objective; a wholly subjective inquiry would undermine the utilitarian imperative underlying selfdefense based on necessity. Sometimes that question is answered
by a statute, or pre-existing rule of law. For example, New York
State permits the use of deadly force in response to a robbery,90 or
a home invasion that poses personal danger. 91 When a statute does
not expressly authorize the particular degree of force, the jury determines case-by-case whether the retaliatory force was proportionate to the threat.92 This decision requires situational or
subjective measurements about comparative size or alternative defensive options, for example, in cases of women or children who,
to
due to their lack of strength relative to their assailants, resort
93
them.
against
force
lesser
of
use
the
despite
violence
deadly
B.

'Legitimate Defence' in Ireland9 4

The Nally case was notable in Ireland for its emotionally
charged and socially divisive facts, but in many less obvious ways it
90 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney).
91 Id.

§ 35.20.

92 There has been a confusing tradition of designating a mistake about proportionality
as a "mistake of law," whereas a misjudgment about the threat itself is seen as a factual
error. For example, using deadly force to prevent property damage is not permitted under
traditional common law principles; any belief that such force is lawful would be a mistake
of law. 2 ROBINSON, supra note 80, § 184(f), at 414-15. This labeling generates some of the
same confusion that occurs in impossibility as a defense to an attempt that has been simpli-

fied by the approach of Model Penal Code § 5.01, which essentially eliminates the distinction. See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 27.07, 436-38 (4th

ed. 2006).
93 See Holly Macguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 416-19 (1991); Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1431 (1990) (reviewing CYNTHIA GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW (1989)).
94 The term "legitimate defence" in Ireland means the "lawful killing of another person
in response to a threat to 'private' [the protection of persons or property] or 'public'
interests." Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper:Legitimate Defence 1 (LRC CP
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raised unresolved issues about the limits of defensive force that recently had come under scrutiny.95 Irish law regarding self-defense
defenses is a combination of statutory and common law principles
that permit and constrain the use of both lethal and non-lethal
force in defense of self, family and home.9 6 The lawfulness of the
use of force in non-fatal offenses is determined by a statute that
supplanted the common law defense.97 In cases of fatal force, Irish
law basically conforms to common law tradition, with a significant
exception of particular relevance to the Nally case: the plea of excessive force that can lead to a manslaughter conviction. It is this
notable, and confusing, doctrine that sets Nally apart from Goetz,
and from most other Commonwealth countries.
1.

The Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act of 1997

The use of non-deadly force in self-defense or defense of another person is now controlled entirely by a statute. The Non-Fatal
Offences against the Person Act of 199798 [hereinafter "the Act"]
41-2006) [hereinafter "Legitimate Defence."], available at http://www.lawreform.ie/
The Irish
Legitimate%20Defence%20Consultation%20Paper%20%20Nov%2006.pdf.
Law Reform Commission was established pursuant to the Law Reform Commission Act of
1975 to continuously review the laws of Ireland with the goal of proposing law reform.
http://www.lawreform.ie/ (last visited July 7, 2008).
95 The consultation paper, Legitimate Defence, supra note 94, released in November
2006 immediately before the second Nally trial, addressed legitimate defenses and the use
of fatal force.
96 Irish law also gives substantial weight value to case law from England. BYRNE &
MCCUTCHEON, supra note 13, at 540.

97 Some aspects of the Irish Constitution affect the law of justification. Enacted by
plebiscite in 1937, the Constitution of Ireland, Bunreacht na hl~ireann, is the basic law of
the nation, superior to both legislative and common law. Id. at 545. It came into operation
on December 29, 1937 after a plebiscite. The Constitution can be changed only by a referendum in which every citizen of Ireland, over the age of eighteen is entitled to vote. See Ir.
CONST. 1937, available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attachedfiles/html%20files/Constitution%20of%201reland%20(Eng)Nov2004.htm.
Ir. CONST. 1937, art. 40-44 set forth fundamental rights guaranteed to all citizens of
Ireland. Several sections are pertinent to cases of self-defense, and much more directly
and specifically address issues of personal autonomy than does the U.S. Constitution. Article 40.3.2 mandates the State to protect every citizen from "unjust attack" and "in the case
of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen." Article 40.4 protects individuals against a deprivation of liberty save in accordance
with law. Article 40.4.1 states that "No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save
in accordance with law." Article 40.5 guarantees that "The dwelling of every citizen is
inviolable and shall not be entered save in accordance with law."
98 Non-fatal Offences Against the Person Act of 1997, Articles 18-20 (No. 26/1997)
(Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1997/en/act/pub/0026/index.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2008).
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authorizes the use of reasonable force in defense of person, family
and home. 99 Departing from a historically objective standard, now
an assessment of reasonableness depends on the circumstances as
the accused believes them to be, a determination that generally is
referred to the jury. 100 Many traditional features of common law
doctrine were absorbed into the statute's reasonableness determination. For example, the duty to retreat before using force is no
longer a distinct element of the defense but is now absorbed into
the jury's overall assessment of the reasonableness of the use of
force.1 01
The statute also reconfigured the standard of reasonableness
from a purely objective calculation to require that the perceptions
of the accused to be taken into account. The law requires the fact
finder to enter the mind of the defendant. 0 2
The Act, therefore, significantly changed traditional principles
of self-defense. The common law formal rules of imminence, necessity (including retreat), and proportionality have been delegated
to the jury in its determination of the reasonableness of the actor's
belief about the need to use force, and whether the force employed
was reasonable under the circumstances.
2.

Irish Common Law Regarding Murder and
Excessive Force Manslaughter

The lawfulness of the use of fatal force, however, is still formally governed by case law, although it appears that some statutory standards have migrated into this realm.10 3 For example, in his
instructions to the jury at the first Nally trial, Judge Carney said,
We assess [self-defence and provocation] in light of what is
known as the subjective test rather than the objective test....
[Y]ou do not look at how the accused behaved in the light of
how you would expect the reasonable man to behave. You look
at how the accused behaved in light of how you would expect
99 "The use of force by a person ...if only such as is reasonable in the circumstances as
[the person] believes them to be, does not constitute an offence ...
Id. at Art. 18(1).
100 Id. at Art. 18(5).
101 "[I]t is difficult to resist the conclusion that, at least as far as the use of non-lethal
force is concerned, the retreat requirement in Irish law is now bereft of anything that can
meaningfully be described as a standard of conduct." MCAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra
note 79, at 744.
102 CHARLETON ET AL., supra note 82, § 13.25, at 1034.
103 D.P.P. v. Barnes, [2006] C.C.A. 165 (Ir.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/
IECCA/2006C165.html

(last visited July 10, 2008).
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him to behave with all his history, warts, baggage, obsessions
and everything. 1°4
A specific determination about the ingredients of imminence,
necessity, retreat, and proportionality would be a prerequisite to
any claim of justified force, including an evaluation of the honesty
and reasonableness of the belief in the necessity of responsive
force assessed from the perspective of the accused.
In every common law jurisdiction, including Ireland, self-defense can be a complete defense to murder. 10 5 Ireland also adopts
a minority view that allows a qualified defense reducing murder to
manslaughter in cases when the accused is entitled to use some
force lawfully, but uses more force than is necessary under the circumstances. 10 6 The Irish Law Commission described "the Plea [of
Excessive Defence].

.

. as a panacea that might alleviate poten-

tially harsh and unjust murder convictions.
a.

10 7

Deadly Force in Self-Defense and Defense of Others

A reasonable belief in the imminence of a threat and the necessity of responsive force to avert bodily harm is sufficient to justify its use as long as the force does not exceed the amount
reasonably required to repel an attack. This requires a proportionality assessment: only a person whose life is threatened can lawfully
respond with deadly force. According to one treatise, Ireland
largely adopts a strict proportionality standard to assess the reasonableness of the amount of force employed.108 But the recent comprehensive comparative survey of the Law Reform Commission
concluded that Irish law is a hybrid in which "proportionality is
relevant to the question of reasonableness but only insofar as there
has been a gross departure from the standard."'0 9

Transcript, supra note 32, at 71.
"A person is entitled to protect himself from unlawful attack. If in doing so, he uses
no more force than is reasonably necessary, he is acting lawfully and commits no crime
even though he kills his assailant." Dwyer [1972] I.R. 416, at 429.
106 Finbarr McAuley, Excessive Force in Irish Law, in PARTIAL EXCUSEs To MURDER
194, 195 (Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, ed. 1990).
107 Legitimate Defence, supra note 94, § 7.134, at 289.
104
105

108 CHARLETON ET AL.,

supra note 82, § 13.17, at 1032.

109 Legitimate Defence, supra note 94, § 6.46, at 245. The Commission recommended

the retention of a proportionality rule. Id. § 6.56, at 248.
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The leading Irish case regarding excessive force is People v.
Dwyer in which the Supreme Court 1 ' ruled that as long as the use
of force was lawful and the accused honestly believed that amount
of force was needed to repel the attack, then an instruction about
manslaughter is required even though excessive force ordinarily
would preclude self-defense."' As one of the Dwyer judges wrote:
[I]f the accused honestly believed that the force he did use was
necessary, then he is not guilty of murder. The onus, of course,
is upon the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
he knew that the force was excessive or that he did not believe
that it was necessary ....If ...it does establish that the force

used was more than was reasonably necessary it has established
that the killing was unlawful as being without justification ...In
those circumstances
the accused . . . would be guilty of
12

manslaughter.'
Another judge agreed with the decision but analyzed an honest mistake about excessive force as a proxy for lack 13of intent to
kill, the mens rea required under the murder statute.'
His intention, however, falls to be tested subjectively and it
would appear logical to conclude that, if his intention in doing
the unlawful act was primarily to defend himself, he should not
be held to have the necessary intention to kill or cause serious
injury. The result of this view would be that the killing, though
unlawful, would be manslaughter only." 4
Dwyer focuses on the perspective of the actor when assessing
the effect of a miscalculation regarding the amount of force necessary. Dwyer himself had used lethal force in response to an undisputedly real threat from two unarmed assailants. Under a strict
proportionality analysis, deadly force would only be necessary and
reasonable in response to an equally deadly threat. Therefore, because he used "more force than may objectively be considered nec'' 5
essary, his act is unlawful, and, if he kills, the killing is unlawful. "
But, Dwyer continues to say that if the accused uses disproportion110 The Supreme Court is the court of final appeal in Ireland. See http://www.courts.ie/
Courts.ie/Library3.nsf/pagecurrent/2D2779D5D7A9FEAB80256D8700504F7B (last visited
July 18, 2008).
Ml Dwyer [1972] I.R. 416. Until this time, case law in Commonwealth countries was
inconsistent. See infra Part IV.C.
112

Dwyer [1972] I.R. 416.

Criminal Justice Act, 1964 (No. 5/1964) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatute
book.ie/1964/en/act/pub/0005/index.html. Dwyer [1972] I.R. 416.
114 Id.
113

115 Id.
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ate force under an honest although incorrect belief that deadly
force was required to repel an attack, then he or she should be
convicted of manslaughter instead of murder.' 16 In effect, Dwyer
sanctions mitigation when the accused committed an error of judgment in a difficult situation and was carried away. In any event,
the decision belongs to the jury.
Irish law, therefore, benefits an accused who overreacts by
recognizing a partial defense to murder in instances of excessive
force, but only if the accused honestly, albeit mistakenly, believes
that the degree of force used is required to repel an attack. Irish
law reaches different results with respect to mistakes both about
the threat and the degree of responsive force lawfully allowed. An
honest and even unreasonable mistake about the threat itself
would result in an acquittal, as long as the accused used reasonably
proportional defensive force. In contrast, a miscalculation about
the amount of lawful responsive force objectively necessary ends in
117
a manslaughter conviction.
The burden of proving that the defendant acted purposely to
kill is on the prosecution.' 18 With respect to a self-defense claim,
once raised by the defendant, Irish law also requires that the prosecution prove that the defendant knew that the force was excessive
(murder) or that it was not reasonably related to the threat
(manslaughter). 1 9
The Dwyer decision itself is not a model of clarity, 120 but it
does establish that voluntary manslaughter not murder is committed "where the prosecution establishes all the elements for murder

116 Id.; see also McAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 79, at 746.
117 McAULEY

&

MCCUTCHEON,

supra note 79, at 743-46.

118 The onus, of course, is upon the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he knew that the force was excessive or that he did not believe that
it was necessary. If the prosecution does not do so, it has failed to establish the
necessary malice. If, however, at the same time it does establish that the force
used was more than was reasonably necessary it has established that the killing
was unlawful as being without justification and not have been by misadventure.
In those circumstances, the accused in such a case would be guilty of
manslaughter.
Dwyer [1972] I.R. 416.
119 McAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 79, at 755-56.
120 In Legitimate Defence, supra note 94 the Law Reform Commission observes, "Unfortunately, the exact basis upon which excessive defenders are relieved of liability for
murder but are found guilty of manslaughter remains unclear." Id. §7.160, at 298.
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but death isn't inflicted by excessive force in self-defense.' 1 21 The
upshot of Dwyer is that if a defendant honestly believes he is defending himself, so that the murder would have been justified but
for the amount of force used, he may be convicted of manslaughter
and is entitled to a jury instruction to that effect.
Judge Carney actually properly instructed the jury consistently
with the longstanding Dwyer holding:
I have ruled that the amount of force here cannot objectively be
justified, but if you find that the accused man in his situation was
using no more force than he considered reasonably necessary in
the circumstances prevailing, murder would not122be made out
and the unlawful killing would be manslaughter.
Dwyer remains good law in cases of lethal force. 12 3 But its
holding is out of sync with changes brought about by the Act, essentially leaving to the jury the resolution of the reasonableness of
all elements of the defense, including the appropriateness of the
responsive force. One treatise author speculates that there have
been few homicide cases to test this proposition since prosecutors
are averse to bringing a murder charge under circumstances where
1 24
the accused likely will benefit at trial from the qualified defense.
b.

Householder Self-Defense

Nally's right to use lethal force was complicated by the fact
that Ward's intrusion occurred in his home. Irish laws governing
the rights and duties of a homeowner against an intruder have been
difficult to understand and apply, apparently leaving homeowners
confused about their legal rights and obligations when confronted
by an intruder. 1 25 The Irish Constitution protects all dwellings
against unlawful entry and permits the use of force to protect the
home.1 2 6 Generally, the use of fatal force in defense of property
121 Law Reform Commission, Report-Homicide: Murder and Involuntary Manslaughter
76 LRC 87-2008, available at http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/Homicide%20Report%
20ONLINE.pdf. The only cases cited by the LRC to support this rule are Dwyer and,
ironically, Nally.
122 Nally[2006] C.C.A. 128 (Ir.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECCA/2006/
C128.html (last visited Sept, 14, 2008), at 74.
123 D.P.P. v. Ceka [2004] C.C.A. 25 (Ir.); D.P.P. v. O'Carroll [2004] 3 I.R. 531 (Ir.);
D.P.P. v. Clarke, [1994] 3 I.R. 289 (Ir.).
124 McAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 79, at 745.
125 See Catherine O'Sullivan, The Burglar and the Burglarized:Self-Defence, Home-Defence, and Barnes, 17 IR. CRIM. L. J. 10 (2007).
126 Ir. CONST. 1937, art. 40.5: 1. Inviolability of the dwelling ("The dwelling of every
citizen is inviolable and shall not be forcibly entered save in accordance with law."); Ir.
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would not be considered reasonable, so the common law placed a
high burden on the property-holder to avoid unnecessary force or
to avoid force altogether. 127 In cases of non-fatal force, the scope
of permissible force in defense of a dwelling is now governed by
the Act. 128 The reasonableness of the property-holder's response,
including whether retreat should have occurred, is a question for
2 9
the jury.1
When death ensues, however, traditional common law rules
prevail to limit deadly defensive force. Shortly after the Nally acquittal, the Court of Criminal Appeal had occasion to decide
D.P.P. v. Barnes, an important case involving the rights of homeowners against burglars (and vice-versa). 13° A burglar charged
with the murder of the householder claimed that he acted in selfdefense when the occupant, returning to his house in the midst of
the trespass, violently attacked the intruder, who then claimed to
have killed in self-defense. Not surprisingly, the Court was unsympathetic to the defendant-trespasser, finding that when an intruder
kills a householder during the course of a burglary, the killing can
never be fully lawful; it can never be less than 31manslaughter since
burglary is always an act of initial aggression.1
To analyze the burglar's proffered self-defense claim, the
Court reviewed the law of permissible responses to a dwelling burglary. It had no difficulty finding, in light of the Constitution and
the Act, that a person cannot be killed simply because he burglarizes a home.' 32 Yet, because a burglar is an aggressor, and the
owner is not necessarily required to retreat from his own home, the
owner may lawfully resort to appropriate deadly force to repel the
CONST., art. 40.3.1 ("The State guarantees by its laws to respect, and, thus as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.").
127 It seems an elementary proposition ... that a person cannot lawfully lose his
life simply because he trespasses in the dwelling house of another with intent to
steal. In as much as the State itself will not exact the forfeiture of his life for
doing so, it is ridiculous to suggest that a private citizen, however outraged may
deliberately kill him simply for being a burglar.
Barnes, [2006] C.C.A. 165; see also McAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 79, at 774-75;
CHARLETON ET AL., supra note 82, at 1029.
128 Non-Fatal Offenses Against the Person Act of 1997 Article 18(1)(c) (No. 26/1997)
(Ir.)("A person may lawfully use force: ... (i) to protect his or her property form appropriation, destruction or damage caused by a criminal act or from trespass or
infringement.").
129 McAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 79, at 776.
130 Barnes [2006] C.C.A. 165.
131 Id. at 10.
132 Id. at 15.
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invasion. The Court then stated that a homeowner may lawfully

employ "retaliatory" force to subdue, drive off, or detain an intruder in order to avert any threat. To determine whether there
was a degree of force that might be excessive, the Court looked at
the Act of 1997.133 Adopting the mixed standard found in that statute, the Court endorsed a "reasonably necessary" standard regarding the use of non-deadly force to protect against a trespass. It
concluded with the observation that liability would rarely attach to
a homeowner unless the force was grossly disproportionate or
malicious.

1 34

The Court's analysis is premised on a theory of justification
based on forfeiture by the burglar, an aggressor who can never be
regarded as wholly blameless.135 Thus, the burglar might be
thought to have no right of self-defense against excessive force
committed by the homeowner. However, the respect for life constraint expressed in Article 40 of the Irish Constitution permits limited recourse to lawful force by a burglar to resist disproportionate
force by the owner. In sum, while a burglar cannot lawfully be
killed simply for being a burglar, considerable leeway to use force
is given to the householder. In balance, Barnes' lethal defensive
force was unreasonable.136
The Barnes case is generally viewed as helpful for clarifying
the legal contours of householder self-defense: 1) A person does
not have to retreat to protect himself inside his home; 2) A home
burglary is an act of aggression and thus a burglar is obliged to
retreat before using defensive force; 3) Under some circumstances,
lethal force used by the homeowner is reasonable. 37 Although the
133 Section 18 states, in pertinent part: "The use of force if only such as is reasonable in
the circumstances as he or she believes them to be [is allowed] by a person [to protect
himself or herself] ... from trespass .... "
134 Barnes, [2006] C.C.A. 165, at 92.
135 Several cases with similar facts have been reported by the English press. See, e.g.,
Gary Slapper, The Law Explored: Self-Defence, TIMESONLINE, Oct. 3, 1997, http:/lbusiness.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/columnists/gary-slapper/article2581201.ece?ILC-EVY
comments&ATTR=LAW. One notable English case involved an elderly man who
wounded a burglar with a shotgun and was acquitted, but later had to pay damages to his
victim. Gary Slapper, Castles Built on Law, 150 NEw L.J. 6941 (2000). There, the Court of
Appeal established that a trespasser is owed a duty of care, even by a person defending his
property, and can be compensated if his injuries exceed reasonable limits. Revill v. Newberry, [1996] Q.B. 567 (U.K.).
136 Barnes, [2006] C.C.A. 165, at 20.
137 Rachel McCrossan, The Nature of the Offence of Burglary and the Permitted Response of a Victim of that Offence, D.P.P. v. Barnes, 17 IR. CRIM. L.J. 30 (2007); Keith
Spencer, Self Defence and Defence of the Home, 17 IR. CRIM. L.J. 17 (2007).
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Barnes analysis ratifies Nally's conduct to a great extent, even
more remarkably, the cases clash on the important questions of the
role of the jury, as will be noted below.
Although the two cases were decided less than a month apart,
Barnes surprisingly makes no reference to Nally or to the Law
Commission's consultation paper issued a month earlier. Barnes is
a genuine step forward in clarifying the rules applying to lethal
force in the home, but it also confirmed the imperative for a coherent statute.
3.

Proposed Legislation

In reaction to feelings stirred by the portrait of the vulnerable
homeowner typified by the Nally case, members of the Irish Parliament 138 sprang into action and proposed new homeowner legislation. Two bills were introduced by members of different political
parties. The Defence of Life and Property Bill of 2006 offers
139
amendments to the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act.
It extends the occupant's lawful use of force to the curtilage of a
dwelling.140 This Bill also provides a complete defense to homicides (murder or attempted murder and manslaughter). In addition, it makes no effort to put the occupant's response in a
framework of reasonableness.
The Criminal Law (Home Defence) Bill of 2006 is the second
effort to address these issues. 4 ' The Bill purports to amend the
1997 Act by creating a presumption that any non-lethal force is
reasonable when used in defense of a home where an unlawful intruder remains inside. 4 z The Bill does not apply to charges of
murder or other unlawful killing. 143 The Bill effectively eliminates
the duty of retreat144 and allows circumstances concerning limited
138 In Gaelic, the Parliament is known as Tithe An Oireachtas. See http://www.oireachtas.ie/ViewDoc.asp?fn=/home.asp.
139 Defence of Life and Property Bill (Bill No. 30/2006)(Ir.), available at http://www.
oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2006/3006/b3006s.pdf. The Bill was criticized as "an
example of rushed legislation used to achieve a political goal .... " Spencer, supra note
137, at 24.
140 This would include a "driveway, access path, garden, yard, area, space, building,
store, garage, and passage in the close vicinity of the dwelling." Defence of Life and Property Bill (Bill No. 20/2006) (Ir.), at § 1.
141 Criminal Law (Home Defence) Bill of 2006 (Bill No. 37/2006) (Ir.), availableat http:/
/www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28bills/2006/3706/b3706d.pdf.
142 Id. at § 3.
143 Id. at § 5.
144 Id. at § 6(c).
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options and decision making opportunities, as well as threats to
family members inside, to be taken into account in the context of a
rebuttal to the presumption. 45 Moreover, this provision uses the
subjective terminology of an "honest belief" about options as the
key to a determination of reasonableness. Finally, this Bill eliminates any potential tort liability for any injuries to a trespasser
a dwelling even those that might
caused by the lawful occupant of
1 46
force.
be the result of excessive
Some members of Parliament noted that any change in the law
would be superfluous since there never actually were any instances
of unjust convictions of homeowners who had behaved reasonably.
Still others defended the current law as striking an appropriate balance between the rights of home occupants and trespassers. 14 7 For
the time being, both Bills are dormant, possibly because some legislators consider these proposals to be unnecessary in light of current law, including the Barnes decision, and suspect them to be
motivated by politics, taking advantage of the law and order sentiments aroused by Nally. 4 8 Meanwhile, the Law Reform Commission continues its work toward a possible legislative overhaul.
C. Excessive Self-Defense in Other Commonwealth Jurisdictions
The excessive force plea did not originate in Ireland, but its
endurance there makes Ireland a stubborn outlier. Today, it is the
only common law country to retain this defense. 149 Prior to Dwyer,
a few cases in Australia and the United Kingdom had grappled
with the effect on a murder charge of excessive force employed
under conditions that a reasonable person would consider necesId. at § 7.
Id. at § 4.
147 These comments appeared in Parliamentary debates available at http://debates.oireachtas.ie[DDebate.aspx?F=DAL20060627.xml&Page=l&Ex=H15#H15. See also Gene
McKenna, Laws to Protect Homeowners who Attack 'Not Necessary,' IRISH INDEPENDENT,
145
146

Aug. 6, 2007; Carl O'Brien, Decision on Householders' Bill Gets Mixed Response, IRISH
TIMES, Aug. 8. 2007, at 2 (announcing Minister for Justice will not publish Defence of Life

and Property Bill approved by prior cabinet in favor of leaving development of law to the
courts).
148 See O'Brien, supra note 147.
149 McAuley, supra note 106, at 194. Only a token number of U.S. jurisdictions weakly
allow the "imperfect defense" when the actor honestly believes that the excessive amount
of force used was appropriate and necessary, but objectively it was not. See, e.g., State v.
Bell, 121 P.3d 972, 978-79 (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-3403(1992) added section to manslaughter statute for intentional killings that result from unreasonable but honest belief in
necessity of deadly force.
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sary. In Australia, in R. v. Howe,15 ° the defense of excessive force
allowed a defendant to be convicted of manslaughter when he reasonably but mistakenly believed he was threatened with deadly
force and needed to respond in kind.151 This doctrine was basically
accepted in Australia, although with some controversy, until 1987
when Zecevic v. D.P.P. (Victoria) effectively eliminated excessive
52
self-defense.
England applies a wholly subjective standard with respect to
the belief in the threat justifying responsive force, so that a mistaken belief about the existence of an imminent threat of death of
serious injury is tested subjectively (was it honest and genuine?)
rather than objectively (was it reasonable?). Thus, the "imperfect
defense" accepted in some U.S. jurisdictions referring to the perception of the threat itself is redundant in the U.K., where even an
unreasonable mistake about the threat can be considered when
53
judging the complete self-defense claim.'
The United Kingdom considered but consistently refused to
recognize excessive force self-defense, even if the defendant believes that the degree of force was reasonable when the force exceeded an objectively determined degree of necessity. 54 As a
result, in the U.K. self-defense is essentially 'all or nothing'-a murder conviction or an acquittal-until the legislature acts.

150 Zecevic v. D.P.P., (1958) 100 C.L.R. 448 (Austl.).
151 According to one commentator, the excessive self-defense doctrine had been recognized in other Commonwealth jurisdictions including Canada, Malaysia, Nigeria, and India, even before Howe. M. Sornarajah, Excessive Self-Defence in Commonwealth Law, 21
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 758 (1972). This author points out that other countries have rejected
the doctrine. M. Sornarajah, Excessive Self-Defence; Further Developments, 24 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 115 (1975) (discussing Dwyer as giving the doctrine "new impetus").
152 "The use of excessive force in the belief that it was necessary in self-defence will not
automatically result in a verdict of manslaughter." [1987] 162 C.L.R. 645, 654 (Austl.). See
also Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, The Demise of Excessive Self-Defence in Australia,37 INT'L
COMP. L. Q. 348 (1998).
153 In England, a mistaken belief about the existence of an imminent threat of death of
serious injury is tested subjectively (whether it was honest and genuine) rather than objectively (whether it was reasonable). A Criminal Code for England and Wales (Laws Com.
No. 177), Vol. 1, clauses 27-30; see also CHARLETON et al., supra 82, § 13.24, at 1033 (citing
Beckford v. R., (1988) A.C. 130 (U.K.) ("A genuine belief in facts which if true would
justify self defence [is] a defence to a crime or personal violence because the belief negatives the intent to act unlawfully.").
154 The leading case on this point is R. v. Palmer, (1971) A.C. 814 (P.C.) (U.K.); see also
R. v. Clegg, (1995) A.C. 482 (H.L.) (U.K.).
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Since English law never accepted the Australian approach that
mandates an instruction on the qualified defense, excessive force
would not preclude an acquittal.
If there had been an attack to that the defence is reasonably
necessary it will be recognised that a person defending himself
cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his necessary defense action. If a jury thought that in a moment of unexpected
anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and
instinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent
that only reasonable defensive action had been
evidence
1 55
taken.
Unlike Ireland, therefore, the English courts begin by determining the subjective claim that the accused believed the reactive
force was essential. Then, if the force used was reasonable under
the perceived circumstances, an acquittal may result.15 6
Self-defense law was reviewed in 2004 by the Law Commission
in England.1 57 The impetus for even considering change came from
the difficulty in applying traditional self-defense doctrine to cases
of abused individuals who kill where there may be a disparity of
strength and size between antagonists so that objectively excessive
lethal force might be warranted, as well as to householders who
impulsively kill intruders. The Law Commission recommended
against a separate partial defense of excessive force in favor of a
reformulated partial provocation defense available to a defendant
who uses disproportionate force out of fear of violence to himself
or another.1 5 8 Their recommendation revised the provocation defense, reducing murder to manslaughter if the defendant acted in
response to
fear of serious violence towards the defendant or another; and a
person of the defendant's age and of ordinary temperament i.e.,
ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, in the circumstances of 15the
9
defendant might have reacted in the same or a similar way.
If this recommendation was adopted, the U.K. would codify a
manslaughter option for individuals whose responsive force ex155
156

Palmer, [1971] A.C. 814, at 844.
R. v. Owino, [1996] 2 Crim. App. 128, at 128.

157 LAW COMMISSION, PARTIAL DEFENCES TO MURDER: A FINAL Report (Aug. 6,2004),
available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc290(2).pdf. The Law Commission is an independent body set up by Parliament to review and recommend reform of the law in England
and Wales. See http://www.lawcom.gov.uk.
158 PARTIAL DEFENCES TO MURDER, supra note 157, at §§ 4.27-4.30.
159

Id. at § 3.168(b).
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ceeds the limits of strict objective necessity without labeling it "excessive self-defense." The shift from a justification-based to a
provocation-like approach suggests that the use of excessive force
out of fear, even without a loss of control, is a morally acceptable
response to an overreaction under extremely stressful and aberrant
circumstances that deserves some leniency. The English recommendation appreciates that a disproportionate overreaction to
some threats may be cool-headed, but nevertheless deserving of
mitigation, thereby giving the jury more alternatives. 6 °
V.

ACCOUNTING FOR ACQUITTALS: EXCESSIVE FORCE,
EMPATHETIC JURIES, AND A RELUCTANCE

TO SECOND-GUESS

Both Bernhard Goetz and Padraig Nally used deadly force
against a person who seemed to no longer pose a threat. Separated
by an ocean and two decades, two juries in cases in which defensive
force was arguably-and, to many, indisputably-excessive, considered self-defense narratives in which villain-victim roles were inverted. Then, they acquitted. These juries considered evidence
that refuted not only the legitimacy of the claim of the threat itself
but also the necessity of a deadly response. Their respective juries
were unwilling to condemn either the subway gunman or the Irish
farmer after they had struggled to put themselves in the defendants' shoes and had seen the world through their eyes.
This section will first examine several familiar explanations for
these questionable verdicts. They are all plausible but nevertheless
conjectural. Then, it will surface an alternative version of what
happens in high-profile, socially disruptive self-defense cases where
judgment is clouded by emotions and morality, where the acts
themselves are anomalous, and where the actors' culpability is
ambiguous.
This latter theory suggests that jurors in self-defense cases
seem comfortable with the task of assessing the subjective genuineness of the fear experienced by the accused. If the defendant is
credible and his explanation makes sense, they say, "Yes, I believe
he was afraid and can understand why." In other words, they read160 The Law Commission reiterated these recommendations in its more recent comprehensive report advocating for a new homicide act. MURDER,
TICIDE, LAW

MANSLAUGHTER AND INFAN-

CoM. No. 304 (Nov. 28, 2006), at §§ 5.47-5.57, availableat http://www.lawcom.

gov.uk/docs/lc304.pdf.
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ily can apply a 'subjectively-objective' measuring stick that concludes, "I understand and agree that he had a right to strike back
against his assailant."
At the next step, however, when they have to judge how this
genuinely and understandably frightened individual should react,
traditionally an objective assessment, they balk at imposing an outsider's judgment of the reaction because they think, "Who knows
what I would do in that situation? I won't punish him if all he did
was miscalculate and hit/hurt/shoot the attacker too much." Since
most modern jurisdictions, including Ireland and New York, delegate to the jury the determination of the relationship between the
triggering event and the reactive behavior, increasingly porous
standards allow jurors to reconstitute self-defense into a judgment
of the defendant's personal accountability rather than a determination about the social value of his deeds.
After examining some customary accounts and reactions to
the two verdicts, it is possible to offer an additional descriptive
conclusion about what might well be happening: Once jurors have
accepted the account of the threat and have subscribed to the defendant's explanation for his fear, in the transition between stage
one and stage two, self-defense transforms into a claim that more
closely resembles an excuse. The jury is unwilling to condemn the
actor, especially when he admits to being out of character, out of
control, beside himself, demented, or deranged, as the defense
claimed at these respective trials. This is particularly the case when
the good guy - bad guy, villain - victim roles are reversed in the
defense strategy and in the media, as was true in both Goetz and
Nally.
Finally, this section will connect this hypothesis to the excessive force doctrine, a middle ground available to jurors reluctant to
condemn the over-zealous as murderers. This would acknowledge
the legitimacy of their fear, yet fix blame for failure to adhere to a
standard of care. Essentially, the manslaughter conviction would
be based on a finding of reckless or negligent use of deadly force.
It is true that neither the Goetz nor Nally II jurors actually resorted to this alternative as a compromise in these sensational
cases, probably because of the intense scrutiny these cases engendered. But in cases out of the glare of the spotlight of public opin-
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ion, the verdict probably would have reflected this compassionate
compromise, as it did in Nally I.161
A.

Conventional Explanations
1. People v. Goetz

The case ran on two tracks. The first was the legal journey
that required a threshold appellate court resolution of the appropriate governing legal standards before the case could even proceed to a verdict on Goetz's criminal responsibility, and then the
trial.' 62 The second, the story heard by the public, experienced by
the African-American community, and related in the media, boiled
down to two competing narratives: the subway vigilante who stood
up to the everyday grinding urban violence in the form of the African-American teenagers who represented New York City's threatening black youth of the day, versus the societal illness of skindeep racism that exploded into unwarranted violence as a white
man pulled the trigger because of his race-based assumptions.
Goetz painfully exposed the role of race in the calculation of the
justification defense, and generated a significant body of literature
1 63
examining this issue.
Juror Mark Lesly provides the insider's perspective, in which
he painstakingly recounts the jury's detailed analysis of the evidence in light of legal standards.1 64 He never mentions race in his
description of the deliberations, and maintains that the jurors took
seriously their responsibility to fairly and impartially judge the
facts. He says that the jury was not convinced that Goetz had in161 This argument does not squarely apply to Goetz since it was not a murder case. But
one of the counts in the indictment was Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree, charging Goetz with engaging in conduct that creates a grave risk of death to another person by
discharging a loaded firearm in an occupied subway car under circumstances that evince a
depraved indifference to human life. N.Y. PENAL LAW §120.25 (McKinney). The jurors
could have convicted him for this extreme reckless conduct. This could be viewed as an
analogous compromise to convicting of manslaughter when using excessive force, essentially a negligent or possibly reckless response.
162 Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96.
163 See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 2; CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE
MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003); Stephen L. Carter,

When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420 (1988); Garvey, supra note 18; Gold-

stein, supra note 5; Yung-Lee, supra note 5; Nelson, supra note 5; Nourse, supra note 5;
Tesner, supra note 5.
164 MARK LESLY, SUBWAY GUNMAN: A JUROR'S ACCOUNT OF THE BERNHARD GOETZ

TRIAL 271-313 (1988). There has been no comparable dissection of either Nally jury's
thinking during their deliberations.
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tended to kill the four men leading to a not guilty verdict on the
attempted murder charges.1 65 Their deliberations were complex
and individualized because there were separate counts relating to
each of the four victims, each of whom played a different role in
the events as they unfolded. The jury also had to be persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defense
with respect to other charges. After many days of deliberations,
the jurors found that there was reasonable doubt about whether
young men on a subway train
Goetz's shooting of four 1unarmed
66
act.
reasonable
a
was not
Others of the twelve jurors, two of whom were black, agreed.
They reportedly found the evidence contradictory and some of the
accounts, they disputed
prosecution case unconvincing. In news
1 67
verdict.
the
in
role
a
that race played
Professor Stephen Carter thinks that the jury accepted Goetz's
explanations for his beliefs and even his claim that he lost control
when he fired at one of the men who had already fallen after being
shot. He believes that the public mythologized Goetz as an
avenger whose conduct embodied their wished-for courage. He
turned the tables on urban predators, and courageously regained
control of the urban jungle. 68
Professor George Fletcher, who attended the trial and wrote a
book that concerns both the trial proceedings and the many underlying legal and moral issues it raised, explains the verdict as a failure of proof. Goetz did not have to convince the jury that he was
justified, even by a preponderance of the evidence; rather, the
169
prosecutor had to prove his use of deadly force was unlawful.
But Fletcher opines that since justification defenses make a claim
about the moral forfeiture of the victim-aggressor, the public has
more trouble disassociating the verdict from a judgment of the victims' worth based on stereotypes associated with race. 7 0
Lillian Rubin, a psychotherapist whose book examines the social context of causes of crime among black youth, reconstructed
Id. at 282.
Id. at 312. See also FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 197.
167 David E. Pitt, Goetz is Clearedin Subway Attack; Gun Count Upheld; Goetz Jurors
Found Both Sides' Evidence Difficult to Accept, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1987, at Al.
168 Carter, supra note 163, at 423.
169 FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 202.
170 Id. at 202-04.
165

166
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the case after its conclusion. She developed a psycho-sociological
explanation for the verdict in a theory of national racism:
We worry about crime in our streets, on our subways and buses,
in our homes. And because young black men between the ages
of fifteen and twenty-four commit a disproportionate number of
those crimes, when we fill in the outlines of the phrase "crime in
the streets," we tend to color it black. When, therefore, a lone
white man shoots down four black youths on a New York subway, our first national 17
response
is a celebration-our first and,
1
last.
our
also
tragically,
Both Rubin and Fletcher allude to the tendency of the public,
and the purposeful strategy of the defense, to reverse the roles of
aggressor and aggrieved. The victims-black, young, rowdy, audacious, a gang-are easily misidentified as defendants, while Goetz,
the accused white, lone subway rider, is spoken about in the language of victimization. This is the very essence of self-defense-the
victim is the blameworthy aggressor, the defendant the innocent
initial target of aggression-but when the tables turn, as they so easily do when the victims share characteristics with racial or ethnic
groups labeled as predators, the roles, identities, and labels of the
participants are hard to keep straight.
Fletcher also flirts with jury nullification as a potential factor
in the acquittal. He asserts that the defense team counted on and
helped to create an atmosphere for jury rebellion but chose not to
pursue this direction overtly because none of the traditional moral
principles justifying jury nullification really were present in
Goetz. "7' 2 The law of assault or attempted murder itself is not unjust, nor was the indictment itself unjust or an abuse of government
power. An acquittal in the face of the evidence might have been
seen either as a request for a runaway sympathy vote or worse, a
vote based on racism, therefore a risky and discreditable strategy. 173 Under these circumstances, the defense is better off appeal171 LILLIAN B. RUBIN, QUIET RAGE: BERNIE GOETZ IN A TIME OF MADNESS 260
(1989).
172 Fletcher speculates that the defense included a subversive nullification strategy, as an
implicit companion to the overt self-defense claim. "[The defense] hoped that popular
sympathy for their client would trigger defiance of the judge's instructions and an outright
acquittal as a protest against the crime." FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 169.
173 In brief, nullification occurs when juries respond to: a just law where an abuse of
power by official misconduct has occurred (coerced confession, perjured testimony); a just
law, unjustly applied to a particular defendant (harshness of sentence or selective prosecution); an unjust law as applied to anyone. U.S. v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997)
(defining nullification as a juror's "intentional disregard of the law as stated by the presid-
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ing to juror sympathy obliquely while arguing self-defense than
risking a backlash from the judge or the jurors who have been
sworn to uphold the law. The flexible language of reasonableness
allows for an appeal to the empathy of the jurors who can personalize their reasoning behind the doors of the jury room.
Professor James Levine, a political scientist, offers a slightly
different version of the jury nullification account. He claims that
the uncertainty of the evidence allowed the jurors to infuse their
deliberations with "subjective sentiments and social interests," resulting in what he terms a "political judgment," ending in a compromise that blamed Goetz for what he clearly did wrong-carrying
an unlicensed, loaded weapon-but
withheld blame for his more
174
acts.
morally ambiguous
Whether the best explanation is a failure of proof, a jury that
harbored unstated racial biases or a community judgment that
Goetz, as everyman, did not deserve condemnation, the acquittal is
undoubtedly a successful formal legal resolution because it ensued
from an apparently fair trial that ended in a unanimous verdict by a
racially mixed jury. Yet, the public in general and African-Americans in particular were dubious and disturbed about this apparent
tolerance for questionable human instincts, biases, and behavior.
2.

D.P.P. v. Nally

In contrast to Goetz, the Nally case to date has generated little
analysis by either scholars or jurors. Reactions were largely expressed in news articles, editorials, letters to the editor, op-eds,
blogs, and other sources of public opinion. 75 In Ireland, the coning judge." Id. at 608). These juries are trying to send a message to the community. W.
William Hodes, Lord Broughham, the Dream Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third

Kind, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1075 (1996). Finally, some juries reach a verdict for lawless
reasons such as racial prejudice. Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of
Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1191 (1997). Brown argues that, while the first three examples of jury nullification are within the power of the jury, and thus the rule of law, the
fourth is not. Id. at 1192. But see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification, 105 YALE
L.J. 677 (1995)(arguing that African-American jurors should be able to "opt out" of American courts by acquitting "guilty" black defendants in certain cases). A comprehensive
bibliography of articles, monographs, and cases related to jury nullification can be found at
Teresa L. Conway, Carol L. Mutz & Joann M. Ross, Jury Nullification:A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 393 (2004).

supra note 6, at 2-4.
175 Since the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision was based on improper jury instructions, there was no direct law about self-defense generated by Nally I other than an affirmation of the Dwyer rule. In contrast, Barnes received some attention as a significant case
174 LEVINE,
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versation over the two-year course of the Nally case was less about
legality and more about how the divergent stereotypes infiltrated
both the prosecution and the national consciousness. The honest,
hardworking, country farmer caught in a legal web and the dead
itinerant ne'er-do-well Traveller competed for sympathy and understanding. Most media accounts favored Nally while few expressed much compassion for the dead man other than to refer to a
"tragedy" for everyone involved. Even more than Goetz, the more
homogeneous Irish public victimized Nally and demonized Ward,
the crime-prone Traveller outsider.
As in Goetz, the acquittal could be the product of a deliberative, reliable and objective jury applying the law to the facts.
Under this view, the jury could have applied the proper legal standard for self-defense, finding that it was reasonable for Nally to
have believed he was about to be attacked, and that his reaction
was objectively appropriate. This explanation falters in light of the
earlier manslaughter conviction, when the original jury found that
he did act in self-defense but used excessive force. Ironically, those
County Mayo jurors, who might have been expected to go easy on
their neighbor, probably had more immediate capacity to assess
the familiar situation of the lonely farmer and the Traveller intruder. Their conviction carries much weight.
The Nally H verdict also could be understood as juror rebellion based on emotion and empathy and a dislike of the legal strictures within which they had to make a decision. First, the jurors
simply may have disregarded legal standards, preferring to identify
with the man who could have been their own relative at the expense of rational decision making, and to show him mercy despite
the law.176 Perhaps the jury believed that a homeowner's right to
use lethal force against a trespasser is paramount irrespective of
about householder self-defense. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 125, McCrossan, supra
note 137.
176 Jury nullification is also recognized in the Irish legal system.
Both judges and legislators have accepted that while a jury properly instructed
by the trial judge has no right to bring in a verdict for the accused which is
against the evidence, yet they have a power to do so; and that the risks inherent
in any efforts at controlling the exercise of that power would not be warranted.
The use of the power to err in favour of the accused is left to the consciences of
the jurors. In any event, what may seem to judges to be a perverse verdict of
acquittal may represent the layman's rejection of a particular law as being unacceptable. So it is that such verdicts have often led to reform of the criminal
law.
D.P.P. v O'Shea, [1982] I.R. 384, 438 (Ir.).
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constitutional or statutory law to the contrary. The jury's acceptance of Nally's explanation of his fear and his extreme violence
also could have derived from its members' own prejudices against
Travellers.

1 77

Whether this is a morally justifiable act, a legally justifiable
act, a circumstantially justifiable act, an unjustified act, or even an
unjustified hate crime depends on which view accounts for the verdict most reliably or logically. One side of the debate in Ireland
attempted to cast the case as a matter of understandable behavior
for someone living in rural isolation, particularly when the laws offer few choices to juries in complicated situations.178 Others asked
whether Ward would be dead if he were not a Traveller. 1 79 And

while Nally supporters denied that racism played a role in either
the shooting or the verdict, at least one commentator observed sorrowfully that
[t]he bitter legal, political and social debate which followed
Nally's acquittal for murder exposed the chasm that exists between Travellers and the settled community [non-Travellers].
What is perhaps more troubling, it revealed how difficult it is to
have a frank and open debate, without accusations of prejudice
and racism. 8 °
B.

Unconventional Explanations-"JudgeNot,
Before You Judge Yourself"''

To reconsider the Goetz and Nally acquittals, assume that
their respective juries had deliberated carefully and had decided
that both of these men were genuinely fearful of being physically
177 Ireland's increasingly diverse population is only beginning to stimulate questions
about jury impartiality that previously had not been a concern in Irish legal culture. See,
e.g., James M. Jeffers, The Representative and Impartial Jury in the Criminal Trial: An
Achievable Reality in Ireland Today?, 18 IRISH CRIM. L.J. 34 (2008).
178

See, e.g., Juries Have Few Options-It's Time to OverhaulHomicide Laws, IRISH INDEDec. 16, 2006; Nally Case and the Law, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 16, 2006.

PENDENT,
179 See,

e.g., The Reality is That We Rate Some Lives over Others, IRISH INDEPENDENT,
Dec. 16, 2007 ("communal gut instinct for hierarchies telling us that, on balance, there are
citizens' lives which are expendable for the greater good."); What Chance Has a Traveller
Offender Before an Irish Jury?, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at 15; Implications of Nally
Verdict, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at 17 ("Travelling community has the right to feel hard
done by.").
180 Liberty, But Sharp Debates Will Rumble On for Years, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 1,
2006, available at http://www.independent.ie/national-news/liberty-but-sharp-debate-willrumble-on-for-years-64666.html.
181 Bob Marley, Judge Not (1961), available at http://www.sing365.comlmusic/lyric.nsf/
PrintLyrics?OpenForm&ParentUnid=8DF84D6F603DC3D248256F6600103C1A.
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harmed. In addition, their fears were understandable in the eyes of
their peers given their personal histories, the particular setting, and
the general environment. Assume further that the law permits the
use of responsive force to repel an attack under these conditions.
Having thus concluded that the defendants were lawfully entitled to resort to defensive force (or at least that the prosecution
had not proven that they were not), the jury now must resolve
whether their responses were reasonably related to the threat. By
the time the proportionality question is in the hands of these jurors, they have developed a great deal of understanding, belief, and
sympathy for the defendant, and they are disposed to forgive.
They have chosen to credit the fear. To accept the further claim
that the accused considered the force to be appropriate and necessary, and, more importantly, that anyone else in his position would
feel likewise, is a small and easy step. The decision to acquit regardless of the amount, degree, or strict necessity of the specific
response is an extension of the empathy and respect for the individuality of the accused that are built up during deliberations or
that may derive from juror identification with the accused based on
shared norms. 82
A strong potential explanation for the verdicts in Goetz and
Nallyis juror deference to the judgment of the individuals on the
front lines. The legitimacy of fear of physical harm confirms the
response and validates the beliefs of the individual involved. Jurors who already have identified with that person's fears will make
this connection readily and be more hesitant to second-guess how a
frightened, even terrified, person should have reacted. This is true
even if the jury is told to apply an objective standard to assess
whether the accused could have used less force, retreated, or otherwise avoided violence. For one thing, there is far less consensus
about decisions to fight, to turn and run, or to call for help. 183 For
another, in any group of people, a natural resistance to presuming
or judging how someone else should or would behave in split-second reaction time under extreme pressure leads to a reasonable
182 After conducting an extensive experimental study, Dan M. Kahan and Donald
Braman concluded that jurors in self-defense cases engage in instinctive "self-defensive"
decision making "to form a view that affirms their group norms." Kahan & Braman, SelfDefensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2008).

183 Every year in my Criminal Law class, students split fairly evenly about whether they
would resist or run if confronted by a mugger, suggesting that there is no single predictable
reaction to this threat.
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doubt sufficient for acquittal. Finally, this instinct to defer is enhanced when the jurors are more likely to find links, parallels, or
similarities between themselves and the accused, and differences or
disparities with the victim.
The impulse for jurors to exercise independence increases as a
consequence of the lack of legal options. Greater constraints and
inflexibility frustrates jurors so they may reach for creative inferences and explanations that yield more appealing solutions. Letters to the editors of Irish newspapers criticized the rigidity of the
law in cases of self-defense: convict of murder or manslaughter, or
acquit. 18 4 And Ireland offers even more choices than the U.K. or
the U.S. Goetz juror, Mark Lesly, voiced similar distress about the
constraints imposed by the available legal categories. 8 5 For jurors,
these verdict choices insufficiently account for the more complex
practical and moral dimensions of snap decision making in dangerous situations.
The Nally I jury had a much easier job without the full defense
instruction, but, in the absence of this instruction, it is impossible to
know whether it would have acquitted. The manslaughter option
based either on excessive force or on provocation allowed them to
avoid the severity of a murder conviction to compromise on a
charge that was the most lenient and possibly the most accurate
available at that trial. But when, even with identical evidence,
Nally H permitted the full acquittal possibility, that jury had another path to travel. They had the freedom to acquit and they took
advantage of it, even in a case where, in the words of Judge Carney, self-defense could not "objectively be justified."' 86
In cases where the potential verdicts all may seem too damning, some additional lesser verdict choices would make deliberations and outcomes more nuanced and reliable. A manslaughter
verdict based on excessive force would fit more precisely since the
conduct is largely negligent, or at worst reckless, if the response
184 See, e.g., Juries Have Few Options-It's Time to Overhaul Homicide Laws, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 16, 2006.
185 1 suggest that the fault in failing to convict him lies not with the jury nor the
judge nor the prosecutor, but with the deficiency in the justification
laws ... [which are] not specific enough about the alternatives Goetz should
have been required to seek before being allowed to fire his gun as a legitimate

act of self-defense.
LESLY, supra note 164, at 315.
186 Transcript, supra note 32, at 74.
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was grossly disproportionate.187 The verdict might be a more correct reflection of the degree of culpability. But in the absence of
additional gradations of criminal responsibility, once a juror had
empathized with Goetz's or Nally's fears, and could understand
their reactions, even if their responses exceeded legally acceptable
boundaries, that juror would be more unwilling to impose an outsider's values to a set of circumstances that he or she had not experienced. Given the harsh alternatives on the guilty verdict side,
it is not hard to imagine that a juror would defer to the judgment of
the person in the situation principally because all other options are
too punitive.
To a hamstrung jury, acquittal begins to look like the fairest
outcome in this world of scarce choices, and it is not so difficult to
say, "We were not convinced that his behavior was not reasonable." And, if the acquittal cannot fit within the legal categories
they are given, the jury may reinterpret the already malleable standards of justification and infuse some of the factors more traditionally associated with excuse defenses.
1.

"Acts Are Justified; Actors Are Excused."188

If not-guilty verdicts can represent an impulse of a jury driven
by compassion to ask its own questions or to provide its own interpretations of the evidence, then an acquittal could be seen as a
derogation of its obligations, a form of nullification. 189 A more
likely, and less radical, view is that the jury rebuffed the required
external balancing of threat and reaction inherent in a self-defense
in favor of the internal, individualized assessment of the emotional
and psychological effects of fear and its consequences on judgment
and self-control. Consciously or not, they have shifted the framework of their analysis.
It is not difficult to understand why a jury's thinking would
metamorphose from the weighing of beliefs and conduct inherent
in an analysis of reasonableness into an exploration of the accused's psyche and emotions during deliberations about the second
phase of self-defense. When Goetz or Nally described their own
187 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4, basing negligence on a "gross deviation"
standard. Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
188 1 ROBINSON, supra note 79, § 25(d), at 100-01.
189 The jury's power to enter an unreasonable verdict of not guilty, jury nullification, is
generally understood as a corollary of the rule that there is no appeal from an acquittal.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 n. 10 (1979).
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reactions, or when others portrayed them, they used such terms as
disturbance, anxiety, frustration, dementia, paranoia, obsession,
loss of control, explosive, and overreaction. Their stories are
marked by strangeness and eccentricity.
In his taped statement, Goetz was was described as appearing
"agitated and angry" and "disturbed about what happened and
anxious whether anyone in the legal system w[ould] understand
him and the terror he experienced before he aimed and shot at
Troy Canty and then pulled the trigger four more times."1 0 The
defense expert offered testimony that supported Goetz's claim that
he was on "automatic pilot" when he continued to fire. 191
Nally is depicted as growing increasingly peculiar in his isolation. His sister checked up on him every weekend. His compulsions and fearfulness manifested in many quirky behaviors before
the incident. For example, he repeatedly told the police that "he
was out of his mind with worry.

' 192

His conduct during the beating

and shooting was always related as being out of character and
exceptional. 193
Playing to the jurors' emotions-compassion for the defendants, and distrust of or prejudice against the victims-at both trials,
the victims were depicted in predatory and threatening terms.
Fletcher describes how the Goetz jury saw a recreation of the
crime staged with four black men "dressed like street toughs

. .

in

a version blatantly favorable to the defense... [that] began to reek
with danger. "194 The Nally juries were informed about John
95
Ward's extensive criminal and psychiatric background.
All of these characterizations encourage a big conceptual step
away from the supposedly rational evaluation of self-defense even
when it occurs in a volatile, split-second situation. Instead, overreaction to a threat begins to resemble a hot response that either
supra note 2, at 116, 118.
191 Id. at 120. The defense theory to explain the multiple, and seemingly unnecessary
extra shots, coined two catch-phrases: "rapid succession" and "automatic pilot." Id. at 174.
192 'The Pressure Had Got to Me,' IRISH TIMES, July 16, 2005, at 3; see also Shiel, supra
note 33, at 2.
193 Michael Brennan, Farmer Pleads 'Not Guilty' to Murder of 'Burgling' Traveller, IRISH
NEWS, July 14, 2005, at 22 ("I was out of my mind."); Tom Shiel, supra note 33, at 2; Nally
'Demented with Fear' of Attack, Says Neighbour, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 8, 2006, at 5.
194 FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 129.
195 He had a history of "impulsive aggressive outbursts and auditory hallucinations" and
had spent time as a psychiatric in-patient. What Drove a Shy, Kind Man to Kill?, IRISH
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2005, at 3.
190 FLETCHER,
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lacks self-control, or is controlled by fear rather than reason. Anger, disturbance, or hysteria replaces restraint and common sense.
The actor is altered by even these temporarily transformative and
disabling conditions so that more objective measurements become
increasingly difficult to apply. The jury shifts into a more subjective assessment of personal blameworthiness, and from there to
blame the conditions rather than the person. The jurors may not
be consciously flouting their duties, but when they are unable to
separate themselves from the deeds they are being asked to judge,
they reject the job of assessing blaming neutrally.
Excuse defenses focus on personal disabilities that exculpate
individual accountability. An excuse is predicated on an abnormal
condition, often arising externally like a threat, but also internally,
like insanity or infancy, without which the defendant would not
have committed the crime. The excusing condition could be temporary or permanent. In brief, the accused does not deserve to be
punished because of this condition even though his conduct may be
wrong. 196

Unlike the U.S. or other countries, 97 in Ireland, the defense
categories of "justification" and "excuse" do not seem to dominate
the literature. One treatise reviewing the evolution of defenses
finds that various individual defenses have "emerged ...through

•. competing application of conflicting doctrines... [and] dynamics includ[ing] compassion[, a] . . . concession to the realities of

human frailty, a consideration of what is appropriate when confronted by unlawful conduct of another party,... and a desire en-

198
shrined in the Constitution to do what is just.
Even without a jury instruction about an excuse such as duress, with the right set of facts, a jury drifts into that territory.
When the only difference between acquittal and conviction is one
of degree between appropriate and disproportionate retaliatory
force, a mistake of perception under stressful circumstances, the

196 See generally ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 9.1 (1999), at 477-80 (an excuse defense is
a disability that causes an excusing condition); LAFAVE, supra note 83, § 9.1(4), at 448;
SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 83, at 247-49 (U.K.). This article assumes that juries are
unaware of theoretical differences between justification and excuse defenses that have generated much academic discussion. See, e.g., FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
(1978), chapt. 10 generally.
197 See generally ROBINSON, supra note 79; JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE-COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVES (Albin Eser & George P. Fletcher eds. 1987); JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE
IN THE CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (Michael Louis Corrado ed.1994).
198 CHARLETON et al., supra note 82, §12.10, at 1021-22.
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paradigm converts to one of unique personal circumstances fitting
the language of excuse rather than justification.' 99
2.

Nally I v. Nally H

How does this relate to the verdicts in Nally? On its face, the
reversal had nothing to do with excessive force; rather, it actually
affirmed the vitality of the doctrine in Ireland. The formal basis for
the reversal seems unassailable. The law in Ireland is clear that a
judge may not direct a guilty verdict no matter how conclusive the
evidence of guilt."' 0 But, in light of the overwhelming evidence of
excessive force, the decision suggests that more may have been at
stake than the narrow issue of jury instructions. The Court of
Criminal Appeal gave Nally a second bite at the acquittal applean outcome that Judge Carney clearly had sensed was such a strong
possibility that he purposefully withheld it from the jury, knowing
that a total not guilty verdict would have been contentious and difficult to defend.
Judge Carney's instruction was careless but understandable
given the uncontested evidence and a well-founded belief that jurors are sympathetic to victims of home invasions, particularly
when they are vulnerable bachelor farmers. The later acquittal
confirms this instinct. The judge certainly made some mistakes. 0 1
He prejudicially characterized the self-defense claim as "per199 Fletcher cites excessive force in a state of shock as an example of an "exotic ... potential excuse." FLETCHER, supra note 196, § 10.3, at 799.
200 Davis, supra note 48. The same is true in the U.S. "Although a judge may direct a
verdict for the defendant if the evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he may not
direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the evidence." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993); United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. United
States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947). On the other hand, in the U.S., it is axiomatic that a judge
has a duty to instruct on a lesser included offense or a defense only if supported by the
evidence. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); see, e.g., Kansas v. Bell, 975
P.2d 239, 248 (2004); Peavey v. Texas, 248 S.W. 3d 455, 464 (2008); Kirk v. State, 656 S.E.2d
251 (Ga. 2008). A defendant does not have "the right to offer a particular defense or to
demand [that] a jury be instructed on any theory." Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 853
(6th Cir. 2002). A court, therefore, may properly refuse to instruct the jury about selfdefense in the absence of evidence supporting the elements of the defense. See, e.g., Lewis
v. Bock, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4020, *17 (N.D. Mich. 2006) (failure to instruct on imperfect self-defense not error); United States v. Poe, 442 F.3d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir. 2006); People v. Moore, 797 N.E.2d 217 (Il. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2003); People v. Hayes, 502 S.E.2d 853,
871 (N.C. 1998).
201 He never explicitly reminded the jury that a reasonable doubt could be the basis for
a not guilty verdict irrespective of the persuasiveness of self-defense theory, since the prosecutor must disprove the self-defense claim. Transcript, supra note 32, at 60-123 (entire
jury instruction).
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verse. 202 Yet, he also never expressly told the jury it had no power
to acquit in the event of sufficient evidence of the crime, or even to
acquit notwithstanding the evidence.2 °3
The appellate decision implies that an excessive force instruction cannot be given in isolation but must accompany an instruction on the full self-defense, thus becoming a species of "lesser
included defense." The C.C.A. may have intuited, as did Judge
Carney, that a jury might well disregard all of the compelling evidence of excessive force to acquit anyway given the social and cultural context of the case. Given the facts, the ultimate acquittal
makes sense only if it reflects a judgment about Nally personally,
and the effects that Ward's intrusion had on him, not whether his
conduct was socially or legally acceptable.
The reversal gave the second jury a chance to judge the actor
rather than his acts. An eavesdropper in the Dublin jury room in
December 2006 might have heard jurors hypothesize about Nally's
fears: He was all alone and Ward might return. Ward might return
with reinforcements. Nally had to use a firearm against the
younger, stronger Ward. They might have talked about their own
rural relatives' isolation or their negative experiences with Travellers. Many of these explanations for Nally's conduct were offered
in the months leading up to the trials; now they had a chance to
permeate the jury room. These theories might seem sufficiently
rational to support a self-defense claim. Even the Nally I verdict
reflected the first jury's acceptance of his claims of fear otherwise
he would have been convicted of murder. It is more difficult to
imagine the second jury's speculations about why Nally had to
bludgeon Ward, shoot him, and then reload to kill the incapacitated fleeing man. The jury had to reach for reasons to connect the
crippling fear under which he claimed to have been functioning to
validate the deadly force, or to explain the violent manner of the

202 Id. at 73. This language probably strikes U.S. readers as inflammatory, but the term
may be more acceptable in Irish legal rhetoric.
203 A judge rarely would inform a jury of an affirmative power to acquit notwithstanding
the weight of the evidence. The nullification power is not a right, Sparf v. United States,
156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895), therefore, U.S. courts generally refuse to give a jury instruction
that it may ignore the law, see, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
38757 (cases cited at *7) (2d Cir. 1996), and repudiate defense efforts to argue nullification,
see, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1189-91 (1st Cir. 1993).
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killing to absolve him totally instead of convicting of
manslaughter. 0 4
To find support for the hypothesis that there may have been a
hidden agenda in the C.C.A. to advance the rights of homeowners,
compare Nally to Barnes. Nally I was reversed because the trial
judge found that attack did not satisfy the elements of self-defense,
so he limited the jury's options. The C.C.A. ruled that this was the
equivalent of a directed verdict of conviction because the Nally I
jury could return no lesser verdict than a manslaughter conviction.
Yet, in Barnes, the same court said that the killing of a householder
by a burglar-aggressor can never be less than manslaughter. This
effectively removes the ability to acquit from the jury even if the
intruder had used no more force that was reasonably necessary to
repel an excessive attack by the householder. When the burglar,
rather than the homeowner, is on trial for murder, the judge can
direct the jury to convict. A jury evaluating the actions of a homeowner-Nally-has the full range of verdicts available, while the
jury judging the burglar-Barnes-cannot acquit.
This blatant inconsistency is almost impossible to reconcile.
The contradiction concerning the power of the jury to consider all
the events and possible explanations for the defensive force seems
entirely result-driven in favor of expanding homeowner rights. The
Court of Criminal Appeal actually ignored its own decision in
Nally in order to provide homeowners a much more expansive
right to use fatal force, and to restrict the scope of lawful defensive
force used by an intruder. By almost abolishing any constraints on
a householder's deadly force, the C.C.A. has both fortified the full
self-defense claim and eliminated the manslaughter mitigation because almost no amount of force would be considered excessive.
The acquittal in the Nally retrial may be proof of unstated judicial
values about defensive force at work at the appellate level that motivated the reversal, just as much as the values more directly expressed by the ultimate verdict.
The reversal contains a strong, albeit implicit, recognition not
simply of the inherent power of the jury to acquit, but also an acknowledgment of the dynamics and tendencies of a jury in this type
of case to struggle against the limitations of legal categories in
204

In Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal

Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996), the authors cite the Goetz acquittal as an example of
a jury's validation of dignity and honor in circumstances when the accused uses excessive
force. Id. at 330-32.
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favor of a more libertarian rough justice that infuses rationality
with compassion and subjectivity.
3.

Law Reform Efforts to Legislate a New Path

The Nally case raises two issues regarding self-defense. The
first is the localized question about the continuing viability of the
excessive force defense. The second asks the more systemic question about not guilty verdicts in cases where there is strong evidence of excessive force. Even in Ireland, where a compromise
verdict is available, the jury acquitted.
Ireland is exceptional for its recognition of a partial excessive
force defense. The Court of Criminal Appeal decision in Nally is
significant for its affirmation of the principle. The defense recognizes that there is a distinction between a cold-blooded murder and
someone who acts overzealously, just as there is a difference between a cold-blooded murderer and someone who acts under provocation.2 °5 It makes sense in a criminal law regime that makes
allowances for provoking circumstances to also recognize mitigation for fear-based overreactions.
If flexibility and compassion has a place in self-defense doctrine, it should be recognized more overtly, and not based on a
single case whose holding has been over-cited and oversimplified
over thirty years. Prompted by the 1997 Act as well as confusing
case law concerning fatal force, The Irish Law Reform Commission
undertook its review of lethal defensive force in the context of an
evolving reasonableness standard. But that standard is malleable,
and achieves flexibility and simplicity principally by shifting decision-making to non-transparent juries, at the possible expense of
true justice. 20 6 Unless one of the Nally H jurors writes a tell-all
book, the basis for their verdict always will be speculative.
The Law Reform Commission provisionally recommends the
retention of an excessive force defense in the context of any kind
of attack, even trivial, when
a mistaken defender. .. uses lethal force as a result of an honest
but unreasonable mistake . . . in respect of any of the elements
20 7
of the test for legitimate defence.
205 Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, Applying Excuse Theory to Excessive Self-Defence, in

supra note 106, at 163.
206 See Legitimate Defence, supra note 92, § 1.07, at 6.
207 Id. § 7.280, at 326.

PARTIAL EXCUSES,
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To the Commission, excessive force is negligent, or at worst,

grossly negligent, therefore less culpable than intentional conduct. 20 8 In general, the Commission recommends a proportionality
standard that only prohibits "lethal defensive force where ... it is

grossly disproportionateto the threat for which the defence is required. ' '2 9 The Commission helpfully identifies factors that a jury

could take into account in measuring proportionality, including the
gravity of the attack, the number of individuals threatened and the
number of attackers, the possibility of harm to others, and other
possible consequences of the use of force.210
One strong reason for preserving this doctrine is to reduce the
likelihood that an "all or nothing" approach will produce unwarranted acquittals. Of course, the Nally II verdict undermines this
rationale, since the second jury also had the option of convicting
for manslaughter. However, that inconsistency can be explained
by the exceptional drama and upheaval surrounding the case, and
that it involved a home invasion. These factors may account for its
extreme outcome, whereas the more typical excessive force case
arises in barroom or poolroom brawls.2 1 By retaining a sliding
scale of culpability based either on intent or mistake, and providing
more choices to the jury to fit deviate conduct within the legal
framework, a jury can achieve fairer results that the public can accept more readily in the vast majority of defensive force cases.
Although England never allowed an excessive force plea, the
English Law Commission in recognition of the need to offer alternatives recommends categorizing excessive force as a type of partial responsibility, much like provocation. It recommends
reformulating excessive self-defense as a variation of manslaughter
based on fear.212 Apparently, this effort was motivated by an increasing number of cases involving the use of lethal force where
abused people who kill when less force was required to avert the
attack, and threatened householders will use deadly force against
intruders.213 The Commission redrafted the manslaughter statute
to include a fear-induced manslaughter section immediately follow208
209
210
211
212
213

Id. § 7.275, at 325.
Id. § 6.68, at 250 (emphasis added).
Id. § 6.69-6.83, at 250-54.
See, e.g., Clarke, [1994] 3 I.R. 289; D.P.P. v. O'Carroll, [2004] 3 I.R. 531 (Ir.).
PartialDefenses to Murder, supra note 158, § 3.168, at 70.
Id. §§ 4.17-4.24, at 77-79.
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ing the definition of provocation.2 4 England has taken an additional step of creating a new crime instead of relying on a possibly
artificial or inapt provocation instruction. t5 Under the proposed
new partial defense in England, intent to kill is an element of the
crime and the same standards of judging the defendant's behavior
apply to both aspects of the reformulated definition. 16 Because
provocation is based on a loss of control or reason, whereas acting
out of fear may be rational and cool-headed, the respective defense
definitions are distinct and separate even though they appear in the
same section of manslaughter.
England amended its self-defense laws in 2008 to allow for
consideration of excessive force in self-defense, although the new
law did not enact a fear-based manslaughter option. 217 As in the
past, whether the degree of force used is reasonable takes into account the circumstances as perceived by the defendant. But now,
the legislation expressly acknowledges that a "person acting for a
legimate purpose may be be able to weigh to a nicety the exact
measure of any necessary action" and that an honest and instinctive belief in the need to use force is "strong evidence" of reasonableness.21 8 These changes permit a full acquittal.
214 At common law, self-defense and provocation were interrelated, in part due to the
inclusion of an assault as one of the legally recognized types of provocation as well as an
event that would justify lawful responsive force. LAFAVE, supra note 83, §15.2(b)(3), at
799; ROBINSON, supra note 196, § 14.1, at 709-10. This historical connection, as well as the
evidence of Nally's aberrant violence, is illustrated by Judge Carney's dual instruction on
excessive force and provocation as two manslaughter verdict options. The provocation
instruction was pro forma and stated, in part:
If the reaction of the accused in totally losing his self control ... appears to ...
have been strange, odd or disproportionate, that is a matter which [the jury is]
entitled to take into consideration ....
[T]he trial judge will tell the jury it is
their job to decide, not whether a normal man or a reasonable man would have
lost his self control in these circumstances, but whether this particular accused
in his situation, with his peculiar history and personality, was provoked.., to
such an extent as totally to lose his self control.
Transcript, supra note 79, at 76-77. Since the Nally I jury did not explain its verdict, the
manslaughter conviction could just as easily have been a judgment about provocation as
about partial justification.
215 In Zecevic v. D.P.P., the case in which Australia abandoned the excessive force defense, the court suggested that provocation usually would provide an adequate framework
for facts amounting to excessive force. (1987) 71 A.L.R. 641 (Austl.).
216 "A person of the defendant's age and of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-restraint in the circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the
same or similar manner." PARTIAL DEFENCES, supra note 157, § 1.13(1)(b), at 11.
217 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, 2008 (c.4), s.76 (Eng.).
218 Id. at s. 76(7). The language "to a nicety" appears in the leading U.K. case, Palmer,
(1971) A.C. 814, at 844.
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Both the Irish and English versions of excessive force manslaughter offer a half-way house between murder and acquittal.
The jury is tasked with assessing the relationship of the response to
the harm threatened. While some juries may overly empathize
with certain defendants, projecting their own feelings and fears
onto the situation and therefore acquit, the middle ground offers a
respectable and rational alternative in the more typical case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The frontier spirit of the Nally case seems to have migrated
across the pond. Indeed, the "shoot first, ask questions later" approach seems more indigenous to the United States. In 2007, Texas
adopted a new "castle" law that eliminated a duty of retreat before
using deadly force to protect an individual's own home.2 19 A few
months later, almost exactly a year after the acquittal in Dublin, a
sixty-one year old white retiree, living with his daughter in a Houston, Texas suburb, fatally shot two men in the back while they were
on his front lawn. Both of the dead men were dark-skinned illegal
Colombian immigrants who had just burglarized a neighbor's
home. During the 911 call during which the operator repeatedly
told him to keep his distance, he had said, "I'm going to kill
220
them.
Six months after the killings, a Texas grand jury declined to
indict him.2 21 This exoneration echoes the generosity of the Nally
II verdict, but in Texas, exoneration has legislative support, not just
a jury's blessing.
The contours of lawful self-defense are debated frequently,
and, when a prominent killing or shooting occurs, the uproar can
turn cacophonous. The legacies of Goetz and Nally in their respective environments contributed to raising consciousness about racial
and cultural prejudice as well as to a national conversation about
the difficult moral and legal questions surrounding self-defense.
But there has been less impact on the development of long-term
enduring legal standards than the brouhaha surrounding the cases
219 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (Vernons). The statute adopts a presumption that
the use of force is reasonable if the actor knew that the victim had unlawfully entered the
actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business. The statute eliminates the duty of retreat.
220 Ralph Blumenthal, Shootings Test Limits of New Self-Defenses Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2007, at A32.
221 Id.
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as they were taking place might have predicted.2 2 2 At the least, the

need for greater clarity about standards is acknowledged so that in
the U.S. some states pass laws refining, extending, and expanding
lawful defensive force rather than rely on common law traditions.
In Ireland and England, cases like Nally and Barnes are providing

impetus for legislative reform efforts.
In the final analysis, controversial acquittals have their great-

est effect far away from the courtroom-in subway cars in New
York City, farmhouses in County Mayo, and backyards in Houston.
The legal case inevitably runs its course. However the verdict is
analyzed, theorized, or interpreted, in the end, it is the community
that has created the conditions giving rise to the use of lethal force
that has to internalize and adjust to the consequences of the legal
narrative to its social fabric and identity.

222 In Hardly the Trial of the Century (reviewing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF

89 MICH. L. REV. 1307
(1990), Prof. Franklin Zimring notes:
Indeed, one key to the sense of disappointment many will feel about this book
is the fact that the Goetz trial does not deserve the close scrutiny Professor
Fletcher provides. No great issue of morality or law was presented to the jury
SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL),

and none was decided ....

Professor Fletcher's close observation of the trial

provides no stunning new explanation of the jury verdict, in large part because
that verdict generated no great sense of mystery among the general public or
professional observers ....

Perhaps the incident which gave Bernhard Goetz

his measure of notoriety was interesting because it typified a longstanding conflict in the law of self-defense. ... The book fails to find the deeper meanings
of the trial of Bernhard Goetz, most probably because they do not exist.
Id. at 1309-10. In contrast, the legal principle that subjectivized that longstanding objective
standard of reasonableness in self-defense, is considered to be "one of the most important
decisions on the question in this century." Richard Singer, The Resuurgence of Mens Rea:
ll-Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 496
(1987).

